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ABSTRACT
Since its publication in 1516, Thomas More's Utopia
has provoked considerable discussion and debate. Readers
have long grappled with the implications of this text in
order to determine the extent to which More's imaginary
island-nation is intended to be seen as a description of
the ideal commonwealth. While traditional readings have
largely relied upon literal interpretations, and
accordingly have emphasized the significance of Utopia as a
model of the ideal society, this thesis endeavors to
explore beyond the conventional or literal appearance of
More's language to consider the possible meanings,
intentions, and strategies underlying Utopia's elaborate
discourse. While acknowledging its affiliation with
classical philosophy, this investigation will specifically
examine the context of Utopia's production and consider
More's work as an example of humanist, rhetorical
discourse; thus the concentration will be specifically on
the significance of More's use of humor and irony and his
familiarity with the conventions of satiric fiction. By
means of this perspective, we will discover what Utopia has
to reveal about the limitations of idealistic philosophy,
the multifaceted construction of identities, the skillful,
iii
yet subtle, use of wit and irony, the technique of
effective social commentary, and the appreciation and
application of a lively joke and learned jest. Utopia still
retains its status as an extraordinarily enigmatic text,
but we can now recognize its remarkable ability to compel
our contemplation of profoundly serious issues relative to
the intricacies of society and the nature of human action
and behavior, at the very same time that it provokes our
earnest laughter and amusement.
iv
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CHAPTER ONE
"BUT ONLY TO MAKE THAT NEW LAND KNOWN HERE":
THE INVENTION OF UTOPIA
Utopia is a work as complex and multi-faceted as the
man who composed it - Thomas More: lawyer, humanist, family
man, orthodox Catholic, and later councilor to King Henry
VIII. It is difficult to say which of these personae was
the most influential in the production of Utopia; and it is
still more difficult to decide which facets of More's
temperament provide the reader a clear way into the text in
order to determine its fundamental strategies and purposes.
More's vision of an imaginary island-state located at the
far end of the earth qualifies Utopia as a work of
fantastic fiction;.its classical rhetorical structure and
philosophical themes associate Utopia with Plato's treatise
concerning the ideal state in The Republic; and More's
skillfully executed use of humor and irony place Utopia
alongside a contemporary landmark work of Christian
humanism: Erasmus' witty social commentary Encomium Moriae
(In Praise of Folly). The result is an elaborately
paradoxical and ambiguous work wherein the author's intent
appears to be deliberately mystified. Thomas More
1
effectively composed a work in which the narrative
structure and rhetorical strategies appear to reflect his
own uncertainty or ambivalence about a number of topics,
including politics, society, philosophy, and religion.
In terms of the narrative, Utopia is by no means
complicated. While it includes a combination of elements
from the imaginative fiction and the travel narrative
genres, Utopia is principally a dialogue among three
interlocutors: Raphael Hythloday, whose description of a
remote communalist island-nation provides the subject upon
which More's work is founded; Peter Giles, a friend of
More's, fellow humanist, and native of Antwerp; and "More,"
the narrator who takes it upon himself to record the
afternoon discourse and Hythloday's subsequent description 
of Utopia for the ostensible purpose of publishing it.1 
Book I is comprised of what has become known as the
humanist debate, or "the dialogue of council," regarding
the question of whether it is better to devote one's life
to civic duty or secluded philosophical contemplation. This
debate then segues into Book II wherein Hythloday proceeds
to offer a discourse concerning "the best state of the
1 I will use "More" to distinguish typographically between More 
the historical author and the participant in the dialogue.
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commonwealth" - using the isle of Utopia as an
illustration. The narrative frame of Utopia opens in
Antwerp where the narrator "More" and his colleague Peter
Giles, after attending mass at the cathedral of Notre Dame,
encounter a stranger. There "More" presents us with his
description of the unfamiliar person: "... a man well
stricken in age, with a black sunburned face, a long beard,
and a cloak cast homely about his shoulders, whom, by his
favor and apparel, forthwith I judged to be a mariner"
(90). The stranger is Raphael Hythloday, a Portuguese
native just returned from a voyage to strange and unknown
places with the Florentine explorer Amerigo Vespucci. And
yet the apparent simplicity of Utopia's structure
notwithstanding, the vast amount of commentary and
criticism produced since its publication in 1516 indicates
that readers have long grappled with the implications of
More's text. Is Utopia meant to be interpreted as a witty
jeu d'esprit that is primarily satiric in its intentions?
Or, is it something more along the lines of a philosophical
or political treatise in which the themes and topics of
discussion are intended to be taken seriously?
The ability of More's text to provoke continuous
debate is based on the consideration of a fundamental
3
question: to what extent is Utopia truly intended to he
seen as a model of the ideal commonwealth? Anyone who
attempts to answer this question solely by way of literal
analysis or interpretation of the text is confronted by the
challenging intricacies of More's work: his incredible
poise as a writer, his vast knowledge of classical
rhetorical forms and narrative structure, and his skillful
execution of language. More's introduction to Utopia
associates his text with such classical works of political
theory as Plato's Republic and The Laws. According to
George Logan, the humanistic interpretations of Utopia that
have relied upon these classical associations have:
... served to establish fundamental guidelines for
the interpretation of the work as a whole, by
proving beyond any reasonable doubt that Utopia
is a careful and essentially serious work, and
that its primary disciplinary affiliation is with
the tradition of political theory. (Meaning 9)
David Sacks acknowledges a similar view in his introduction
of Utopia: "More explicitly identified his book as a study
of 'the best state of a commonwealth,' placing it in a long
tradition of debate regarding the strengths and
shortcomings of various ideal and real polities" (8). In
4
addition to Utopia's subject matter, the dialogic structure'
of the text and Hythloday's explicit references to Plato
serve to uphold the assessment of Utopia as a work
concerned primarily with philosophy and political theory.2 
Yet we are prevented from viewing Utopia strictly in
these terms due to the ubiquitous contradictions evident
throughout the text, which are the result of More's
consistent and subtle use of irony. The most obvious
example of More's irony, as well as his terrific wit, is
found in the very title of his work. For More coined the
term "utopia" from the Greek ou ("no") and topos ("place").
If we take this meaning seriously, then "More's"
presentation of Hythloday's discourse concerning "the best
state of a commonwealth" contains the description of a "no
place" - a nation that can be found to exist "nowhere."
Further instances of irony and contradiction can be
recognized in the names of characters or places:
"Hythloday" is Greek for "speaker/peddler of nonsense."
The name of the main tributary that runs through "Amaurote"
(dark city), Utopia's principal city, is called the
"Anyder," another Greekism which, when translated, means
2 See Sacks, Utopia, 90, 114, and 122-24 for Raphael's use of 
Plato's concepts as support for his own argument.
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"without water." Utopia not only enjoys ownership of a
river without water, but the Utopians can also be proud of
their poet laureate whose name, Anemolius, means "windbag"
and who is credited with writing a 12-line verse stanza
that accompanies the first Latin editions of Utopia. While
examples of verse were composed by several of More's
colleagues to accompany various editions of Utopia, it is
suggested that More himself composed the stanza attributed
to Anemolius. This stanza is notable in that it
demonstrates another level on which More's subtle irony is
working. For in the final two lines of the last quatrain,
Anemolius writes: "Wherefore not Utopie, but rather rightly 
/ My name is Eutopie: A place of felicity."3 More cleverly 
plays on the aural pun of "utopia" by emphasizing its
association with "eutopia." Thus More's "no place" can also
be translated as "good" or "happy place" by the combination
of the Greek eu with topos. Indeed More likely intended his
coinage and use of ironic names to be an amusing feature of
Utopia. These names not only reveal the hoax of Hythloday's
"travel narrative," but they may also indicate that at the
same time More was formulating his model commonwealth, he
3 See Sacks, Utopia, 205-07 for examples of verse composed for 
the early Latin editions of Utopia.
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The depiction of Amaurote as a heavily fortified city is
markedly absurd and out of place when Hythloday has already
characterized Utopia as a land that is virtually
inaccessible to foreigners and experiences no internal
civil strife by virtue of its communalist social
philosophy. Furthermore, the Utopians are described as a
people who detest war, hold jewels and gold in great
disdain, and never bother to lock their doors so that
whosoever wishes to enter the home of another may do so 
whenever they please.4 Why then should the city be equipped 
with such impenetrable defenses? Such paradoxes are woven
into the discourse itself, and they are presented in a most
innocuous and unsuspected manner, yet when recognized, they
lead one to rightly question Hythloday's advocacy of
Utopian institutions and practices as examples of a literal
ideal.
Perhaps more problematic than the instances of ironic
paradox in Utopia are the implications that these various
incongruities are the result of Hythloday's unreliability.
In the case where a spokesperson is clearly unreliable, a
4 See Sacks, Utopia, 133-34 for discussion concerning the living 
situation of the Utopians in Amaurote; and 149-53 for their 
philosophy regarding wealth; and 177-86 for the discussion 
concerning warfare.
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perceptive reader would likely respond by considering the
assertions made by that character with a justifiable degree
of doubt and skepticism. However, in the case of Utopia's
primary spokesperson, this approach is of no avail. In
Utopia, we are presented with a multivalent text that
contains a primary speaker who contradicts himself. And in
spite of the hidden meaning of Hythloday as a "speaker of
nonsense," we cannot simply disregard his statements
altogether, as it is his discourse that provides the
subject and content of Utopia. The problematic nature of
Hythloday's character makes the task of determining where
or with whom our opinions should be aligned exceedingly
difficult. Thus, throughout the debate in Book I and the
discourse in praise of Utopia in Book II, we are never
quite certain when.we will have to reconsider, disregard,
or reverse what Hythloday is saying; we are only left with
the sense that at some point we will have to.
An example of this level of ambiguity emerges through
the course of Hythloday's argument in Book I in favor of
withdrawal from civic duty. When "More" and Giles suggest
to Hythloday that he apply his vast learning and judicious
insight in the service of some king or prince in order to
benefit the public good, Hythloday objects claiming that no
9
sovereign would heed his honest and forthright council.
Interestingly, "More" agrees, answering that such brazen
directness would be completely ineffective at court, no
matter how rational the counsel offered may actually be.
Thus "More" advocates the application of a more decorous
civil philosophy in the advising of kings and princes as
opposed to the direct approach of Hythloday's academic
philosophy. He argues that a civil approach would not only
be more effective, but its use would bring about less 
conflict and contention.* 5 Hythloday, commenting upon the 
alleged inefficacy of his direct approach, counters with
obvious punning on the title of More's work: "That is what
I meant ... when I said philosophy had no place among kings"
(121) (emphasis added).
Yet in Book II, in his description of Utopian society,
Hythloday appears to contradict some of the key assertions
he presented in the debate on counsel. As David Weil Baker
points out, Hythloday's argument against the subtle use of
civic philosophy conflicts with his later narrative in
Book II, which treats the subject of the Utopians' policy 
of religious toleration.6 According to Baker, Hythloday's
5 See Sacks, Utopia, 120-23.
5 See Sacks, Utopia, 187-89.
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account of the punishment of an overzealous Utopian convert
to Christianity who begins fanatically to endorse Christian
principles "serves as something of a corrective" to
Hythloday's previous assertion that a frank and direct 
approach is always appropriate as well as preferable (52).7
The contradiction is made obvious when it is considered
that Utopus, the original founder of the Utopian
commonwealth, declared the law of religious toleration
expressly for the purpose of maintaining the peace:
For this is one of the ancientest laws among
them, that no man shall be blamed for reasoning
in the maintenance of his own religion. For King
Utopus ... hearing that the inhabitants of the land
were before his coming thither at a continual
dissension and strife among themselves for their
religions ... made a decree that it should be
lawful for every man to favor and follow what
religion he would, and that he might do the best
he could to bring others to his opinion, so that
he did it peaceably, gently, quietly, and
7 Baker's example (see 51-53) is presented in association with 
Raphael's reference to Christian homiletics; however, I find it 
offers equally effective support for the perception of Raphael's 
reliability and the degree of difficulty one encounters when 
reading Utopia.
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soberly, without hasty and contentious rebuking
and inveighing against others. (188)
Utopus' law, which Hythloday. here praises, is concerned
less with what the Utopians accept as their religious or
spiritual beliefs than it is with, preventing behavior that
could lead to rioting and civil discord. Thus Utopus
himself, like "More," prefers discretion as opposed to
outright declarations of personal conviction. These
instances where Hythloday's fervent praise of Utopian
institutions and practices in Book II seem to directly
challenge those statements he forcefully expresses during
the debate on counsel in Book I invariably lead one to
consider the question of his reliability; as a result, the
reader of Utopia is teased and bewildered as to More's
ultimate vision of an ideal commonwealth.
The problematic character of Hythloday and the ironic
discourse of Book II result in a veil of ambiguity that
effectively obscures Utopia's overall purpose as well as
any indication of More's own position with respect to the
issues presented within it. The reader's grasp of which
arguments are to be taken as authoritative is precarious.
The author's seeming ambivalence or "lack of voice" is
disconcerting because Utopia, although it is by definition
12
a work of fiction, still- presents itself as an extremely
personal work. For Utopia's narrator is the author's
namesake, and the other interlocutor besides Hythloday is
named after Peter Giles, More's friend and fellow humanist.
Furthermore, the geographical setting of the discourse
between the three interlocutors encourages us to view it as 
a historical record as it is said to take place in Antwerp, 
where More, in the summer of 1515, actually spent a great
deal of time with Giles and began work composing Utopia.
More also demonstrates his admiration for Cardinal John
Morton, Archbishop of Canterbury and Lord Chancellor of
England, by including references to him in Hythloday's
recounting of his previous visit to England. More's
personal association with Cardinal Morton dated back to the
years between 1490-1492 when young More served as the
Archbishop's page. And it was Cardinal Morton who shortly
thereafter arranged for More to attend school at Oxford.
These personal references indicate the extent to which the
certain aspects of More's life are reflected in Utopia.
And yet the life of Sir Thomas More is one that
provides an abundance of fascinating material, the result
of which has been the numerous biographies and historical-
biographical writings that have emerged alongside the
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multiple editions of his published works. J.H. Hexter
points out that many biographical accounts written after
More's death tend to focus on his later life. In these
accounts, More is commonly viewed primarily in terms of his
affiliation with the Catholic counter-reformation - as a
"martyr-hero" and candidate for canonization - a
perspective that emphasizes his efforts to counteract the
progress of the Protestant reformation, his falling out
with Henry VIII over England's br.eak with the Roman
Catholic Church, his imprisonment in the Tower of London,
and his subsequent execution in 1535. Hence, such
biographical accounts downplay More's humanist
affiliations, as well as his abiding friendship with
Desiderius Erasmus, Europe's leading humanist scholar. At
the time of Utopia's publication in 1516, More was nearly
40 years old, a family man, a successful lawyer, and an
Undersheriff of London. Hexter places the historical
significance on these years (1515-1516) leading up to and
immediately surrounding the writing of the text ("Milieu"
xxv-xxvi). These years would seemingly provide the context
for More's ideas as expressed in Utopia.
The course by which Utopia evolved from an amorphous
concept in the humanist-trained, civically-invested mind of
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Thomas More into one of the most significant works of the
Renaissance literary tradition was this: in May of 1515,
More was appointed by Henry VIII to travel to Bruges as
part of a diplomatic council in order to renegotiate terms
of commercial interaction in the trade of wool between
England and the Netherlands. Having reached an impasse in
the trade negotiations, More traveled to Antwerp and spent
several weeks lodging with Peter Giles, a close friend of
Erasmus. It is widely held that More conceived the idea of
his island commonwealth here in the summer of 1515. It is
likely that the two intellectuals, More and Giles,
discussed a variety of matters relating to statecraft and
the order of commonwealths. According to Hexter, such
topics were "a staple item of speculation among scholars
and academics, having got off to a good start in the
literary world with Plato and Aristotle" ("Milieu" xxxi).
By the time More returned to England in the fall of 1515,
he had completed what is now known as Book II of Utopia.
Yet once in London, More would be faced with a
complicated decision, and it was then that he began work on
the dialogue of council that would later become Book I. For
in the early part of 1516, More was offered a position in
the king's service, which also included a salary and thus a
15
means to support his sizeable family. Though More was
already a successful lawyer and an Undersheriff of London,
the question of whether he should devote his life to the
service of King Henry VIII was especially•difficult for
him. As E.E. Reynolds explains:
Tin invitation to enter the King's service in
those times was only short of a command, though a.
refusal would not have led to consequences more
serious than the loss of the King's goodwill;
even that, however, was not to be lightly risked
by one with a strong sense of public duty. (117)
If More decided to continue his independent law practice,
he would be able to preserve, to some extent, his position
as a humanist "man of letters." However, if he accepted the
position as royal councilor to Henry VIII, More would no
longer be able to write independently about any topic he
wished. Now he would have to carefully consider the
potential ramifications of any subject or idea he might
choose to explore in his scholarly or political writings
(Sacks 29). More's struggle to come to a decision regarding
the offer is supposedly reflected in the humanist debate
that takes place between Hythloday, "More," and Giles. His
treatment of Book I further demonstrates the extent to
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which Utopia appears to-be a personal work fraught with his
own conflicted feelings about whether it is better to live
a life of private philosophical contemplation or one
dedicated to public service and political activity.
What was the intellectual movement called humanism
that was sweeping across Europe in the early Renaissance,
and to which More, Giles, and Erasmus, among others, were
connected? As Quentin Skinner explains, humanism came to
northern Europe, first to Paris, then to England, by way of
Italy: "The culture of the Renaissance was further
disseminated in England by a number of Italian scholars who
came to teach at Oxford and Cambridge in the later years of
the fifteenth century" (195). Having come from this
intellectual milieu, More and his colleagues were learned
men, having studied grammar, rhetoric, and history. They
were widely known as "men of letters," and the bond between
them is evidenced in their vast correspondence. Hexter
describes these "men of letters," commonly referred to as
humanists, as follows:
The indispensable marks of a man of letters in
More's day were wide familiarity with the
literature of Roman antiquity; increasingly, some
acquaintance with the literature of Greek
17
antiquity in its original tongue; and, finally,
command of a Latin style modeled with more or
less precision on classical Roman prose.
("Milieu" lviii)
More's engagement with Aristotle and Plato, as well as the
coded Greek names in Utopia, clearly identify the work as a
product of this movement. Yet the humanists were not merely
exclusive intellectuals who thrived as a result of the
revived interest in classical literature and culture, they
were also profoundly concerned with political, educational,
and religious reform. And these interests resulted in books
and writings relevant to social and political theory,
educational curricula, religious discourse, and scriptural
translation and interpretation.
That More's Utopia is a product of this intellectual
tradition is relatively easy to establish. Its subject
matter and classical narrative structure are not the only
indications of the work's humanist origins. The nature of
its publication also reflected the spirit of the humanist
project, as evidenced by the considerable collaborative
effort put forth by those individuals who participated in
More's scholarly circle. As was customary of sixteenth-
century literature, More desired to have letters of
18
endorsement and support composed for the introduction of
his work. The efforts of More's colleagues, combined with
the technology of the printing press, added to the
popularity of More's work. In regard to the "first age of
the printed book," Skinner states: "No group was quicker to
perceive the vast potentialities of the new medium than the
humanists" (195). The early Latin editions of Utopia
underwent five printings in More's own lifetime.
Furthermore, the first editions were accompanied by
Erasmus' and Giles' marginal annotations as well as by
laudatory letters and verses contributed by various members
of More's close association of humanist colleagues. A
Holbein engraving of the map of the island of Utopia and
the Utopian alphabet were later added for the 1518 edition.
Hence, Utopia's printed manifestation bore all the
respectable marks of having been vetted by a group of
internationally renowned scholars and illustrated by the
king's painter.
Through this humanist "republic of letters" that
surrounded Utopia's early publication, its reputation as an
enigmatic text begins to emerge. For the response from
More's own contemporaries who had not been directly
involved in the format and printing of the final work was
19
ambivalent. They grappled with the question of whether
Utopia was intended to be taken seriously or should rather
be enjoyed primarily for its creativity and inventiveness.
According to John Guy, Jerome de Busleyden, a prominent
political official and councilor to Charles V, associated
Utopia with works of classical philosophy and perceived its
purpose to be similar to Plato's: "He interpreted Utopia as
a mimetic exercise in moral philosophy, designed to
reinforce Plato's Republic as a counterweight to Aristotle
and Cicero." On the other hand, Guillaume Bude, the French
humanist and councilor to Francis I, was "unsure whether
More was writing allegorically or literally. His
commendation finally interpreted Utopia as an exemplar of
evangelical Christian humanism closer to Erasmus' Praise of
Folly than Plato's Republic" (91). Thus even from the
beginning, More's work was multivalent. Though Utopia was
certainly innovative and fascinating, it was also utterly
mystifying.
Utopia's ambiguity has largely resulted in
interpretations that propose a false dichotomy.
Accordingly, traditional readings of More's work have
depended upon the privileging of its association with
political discourse while overlooking or ignoring
20
completely the presence of its satiric features and ironic
language. However, any effort to confine Utopia to a single
authoritative reading would not be faithful to the spirit
of More's text. Thus, in order to pursue a more thorough
and comprehensive investigation of More's work, in the
chapters to follow, I will examine how Utopia's irony,
complexity, and ambiguity deliberately problematize any
attempt at a literal or conventional reading of it. This
method will then provide a means to explore the possible
implications, strategies, and intentions of More's work
that have been previously limited as a result of those
perspectives that have opted to view Utopia primarily in
terms, of strict political theory.
By virtue of the humanist context of its production,
the echoes and traces of Plato can be readily discerned -
in its dialogic structure, in the presentation of its
subject, and in the character of the primary spokesperson
Hythloday. It is in acknowledgement of this clear
association of More's work with classical political
philosophy that I begin my investigation in Chapter Two by
considering the interpretation of the work as a model for
social reform - as a description of a theoretical ideal
society. Yet my aim will be to expose the limitations of
21
those interpretations that attempt to emphasize this aspect
of Utopia. Because literal readings are exceedingly
dependent upon the reader's perception of Hythloday and the
acceptance of his assertions in the debate on counsel in
Book I and his description of Utopia as "the best state of
the commonwealth" in Book II, I will particularly focus on -
the questions surrounding Hythloday's reliability. A closer
examination of the rhetorical strategies employed in Book I
enable a more complete and accurate assessment of ethos,
and accordingly, reveals that we cannot routinely conclude
that Hythloday is intended to be seen as the voice of the
valid position in the debate. By means of rhetorical
analysis, we discover that Hythloday's intolerant demeanor
and reductive argumentative techniques encourage our
scrutiny and uncertainty in regard to his character and his
assertions. Furthermore, "More's" eloquent rhetorical
method and gracious manner are seen to be in exact
opposition to Hythloday.
Our awareness of Hythloday as an unreliable
spokesperson is crucial as it prepares us to assess the
validity of his discourse in praise of Utopia in Book II.
A more thorough examination of Utopia's institutions and
practices reveals a variety of absurd and troubling
22
elements that would appear to contradict the status of
Utopian society as "ideal," or the argument that More
intended Utopia to be interpreted as a literal model or
blueprint for social reform. Our understanding of the
problematic aspects of Hythloday's characterization
prevents us from becoming so blindly enamored, as he is,
with Utopian society. Consequently, literal readings of
Hythloday as a reliable narrator or as More's spokesperson
are insufficient and incomplete, and they overlook More's
use of irony, his familiarity with the conventions of
satire, and his ability and skill as a rhetorician.
The limitations posed by literal readings of Utopia
compel us to explore the motivations and implications
underlying More's use of ironic language. To this end,
Chapter Three will begin by considering the friendship
between More and the renowned humanist scholar Erasmus, as
their shared intellectual interests and mutual appreciation
for humor and wit are perceptibly reflected in their
respective works Utopia and Encomium Moriae. More and
Erasmus were fascinated by the works of the classical
satirist Lucian. They recognized Lucian's parodic
depictions of Hellenic society as a valuable means of
social criticism. More and Erasmus accordingly applied
23
Lucianic techniques in their own early writings in order to
comment upon certain aspects of contemporary sixteenth-
century English society. Particularly for More, Lucian's
dialogues provided an effective model from which to
construct the character of Hythloday.
The examination of Hythloday as a satiric persona
offers a much more insightful understanding of his
characterological function than traditional interpretations
that view him as a reliable spokesperson. When considering
the possible target of More's satiric scrutiny, an analysis
of the debate in Book I reveals the similarities between
Hythloday's demeanor and argumentative style with those of
Lucian's cynic philosopher in his dialogue The Cynic.
Lucian used irony and humor to satirize the dialectical
method employed by contemporary idealistic philosophers. In
the same way, More constructs the character of Hythloday in
order to present a parodic depiction of the specious
rhetorical techniques employed by the scholastic
theologians and schoolmen in sixteenth-century England.
Furthermore, Utopia's association with satiric fiction
helps us to recognize the strategy underlying More's
construction of Utopian absurdities in Book II. Rather than
insisting that Utopia be interpreted as an ideal
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commonwealth, More uses the imaginary society as a subtle
means to ironically comment on the absurd features of
European society. At the same time, More's consistent
ambiguity requires readers of Utopia to be active
participants in the process of interpretation and to be
able not only to construe a sophisticated and elaborate
jest, but also to discern the more profound and significant
aspects of his ironic commentary.
While More was known for his wit and sense of humor
and for his dedication to public service, he was also
reserved about many of his individual beliefs. In so far as
Utopia reflects the circumstances of More's life during the
years of 1515-16, it has largely been considered to be a
profoundly personal work. Accordingly Chapter Four will
attempt to consider the greater implications of More's use
of ironic and ambiguous language in order to explore the
complex facets of the author and his work. Utopia provided
More with a means to explore some exceedingly complex and
intricate ideas. Particularly in Book I, More explores the
conflicts of interest that inevitably arise when one is
confronted with a decision that will significantly affect
one's public status. More also understood the constructed
nature of identity - an idea he presents in Utopia by way
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of his "metaphor of the stage." As a result -of his own
various public and social roles, More was aware of the
necessity of fashioning a private self. Thus More
demystifies the conventional scholastic perspective of
human behavior as based on a foundational system of ethics.
Instead, he reveals life to be a series of roles inhabited
by an individual for the purposes of accomplishing a
specific objective. In More's view, this conception of
human behavior underscored the importance of a practical
intellectual education based in rhetoric in order to
prepare oneself to cope with the challenging,
unpredictable, and problematic circumstances of life.
Finally, through the ironic depiction of Utopian
society, Utopia provided More with the opportunity to
explore the limitations of the idealistic intellectualism
that was typically exemplified by the scholastic
theologians. Yet, in addition, More's irony was also subtly
self-reflexive as it examined the idealistic objectives of
the immense humanist project. While humanism believed that
humans could aspire to attain happiness in life, it also
acknowledged that human kind was irremediably sinful and
incapable of perfection. However, More's exploration of the
limitations of human rationality acknowledged that reform
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could not take place if humans could not conceive of a
better society. Thus More's Utopia exemplifies the
humanists' investment in the process of education by
insisting that readers strive to contemplate the complex
and multivalent features of his work, thereby ensuring the
continued education and cultivation of.the mind.
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CHAPTER TWO
"ALL THINGS BEING THERE COMMON":
UTOPIA AS MODEL REPUBLIC
In The Republic (ca. 380 B.C.), Plato presents his
conception of the ideal city. This politeia, ruled by the
Guardian class of the Philosopher-King, possesses a socio­
political structure that exemplifies Plato's philosophical
notions of Justice. Plato's later work, The Laws, proposed
a practical system of laws for an imaginary colony to be
established on the isle of Crete. Subsequently, Plato's
most distinguished-student, Aristotle, composed Politics,
which considers the Greek polis, or "city-state," to be the
highest form of political association. These works were
among the first in a long line of treatises devoted to the
thought experiment of imagining the "best commonwealth"
that would emerge over the course of the next several
centuries. The ideas presented in these texts and in other
ancient works of literature, moral philosophy, and
political theory inspired the intellectual activity of the
Renaissance and provided the foundation for humanist
scholarship. Such works undoubtedly influenced Thomas More,
who received an education grounded in the studia
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humanitatis while attending Oxford from 1492 to 1494. The
issues and concerns relating to statecraft and the order of
the commonwealth were considered relevant topics for
discussion among scholars and intellectuals at the turn of 
the 16th century just as they were for philosophers and 
thinkers of Greek and Roman antiquity.
Utopia has traditionally been viewed as a project
similar in scope to the dialogue concerning Plato's ideal
city. These two societies not only share the practice of
holding all things in common, but they also share a
similarly structured moral philosophy. According to Book IV
of The Republic, the "just" individual aims to fulfill the
desires of the rational part of the soul, while resisting ..
the desires of the spirited and appetitive parts. And the
harmonious socio-political organization of the "just" city
is achieved when.all individuals fulfill the appropriate
societal role fitted to them by nature. More's Utopian
system of order is likewise based on the natural primacy of
reason: "for they define virtue to be life ordered
according to nature ... and that he doth follow the course of
nature, which, in desiring and refusing things, is ruled by
reason" (156). Thus in both societies, the "just" or
virtuous life is presented as the most pleasant. Yet Utopia
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is not a simple restatement of the ideas set forth in The
Republic. The Utopian regime is an amalgamated product of
the socio-political organizations presented in The Republic
and The Laws. In this "ideal" commonwealth, More expands
the system of community of property, similar to Plato's
standard in The Republic, to include all citizens of Utopia
rather than restricting it exclusively to a "Guardian"
class. Likewise, he devises a structure of government based
upon a system of decrees, as proposed in The Laws, which is
carried out by an organization of assemblies and councils,
thereby eliminating the need for a class of Philosopher-
Kings (Sacks 10-11). The association of Utopia with these
texts is a fine way to pay tribute to Plato, but it has
also served as a seemingly effective way, if the majority
of previous scholarship is any indication, of providing the
context for our interpretation of the work.
The influence of the classical tradition
notwithstanding, the interpretation of Utopia as strict
political theory is further based on the humanists'
educational and social objectives. As Quentin Skinner
explains, the northern humanists "continued to accept the
well-established humanist belief that the links between
sound learning and sound government are extremely close"
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(213). As a function of their perceived roles as educators
and political advisors, the humanists produced a variety of
handbooks devoted to the practice of counseling kings,
princes, and other government officials. They likewise
produced treatises devoted to educational reform and the
discussion of the proper training to be offered by the
studia humanitatis. These efforts were exerted with the
intent that those who received a humanist education would
be prepared to serve in a principal position of government.
More's consideration of the role of advisors in political
and governmental affairs was not only based upon the
general interest amongst humanists regarding this issue. It
was also, on a very personal level, a matter of great
consequence for More. For in Book I of Utopia, More
presents two sides of the debate on counsel: "More's"
argument in favor of political involvement, and Hythloday's
argument in favor of withdrawal from civic affairs.
Critics have commented on the inherent ambiguity of
More's text with regard to the inevitable question of which
of these two perspectives is intended to be understood as
the valid position. One conclusion offered by George Logan
concentrates on Giles' comparison of Hythloday to Plato.
This comparison associates Hythloday's ideals with those of
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moral philosophy, a branch, Logan states, "to which
political theory is traditionally attached" (34). Indeed
Hythloday does invoke the name of the great philosopher
multiple times in the course of his argument. This, in
connection with the similarities between Utopia and the
elements characteristic of Plato's dialogues, leads Logan
to conclude: "In sum, Hythloday seems designed for the role
Plato's spokesmen play in these dialogues: that of
completely reliable commentator on comparative politics and
a highly authoritative political theorist" (35). To be
sure, if one considers in addition that the debate on
counsel is sparked by a compliment offered, during a moment
of seemingly genuine admiration, in acknowledgment of
Hythloday's wisdom and astute faculties of observation and
analysis of foreign governments, and if we recognize
further that Hythloday is allowed to dominate the dialogue
of Book I with his prolonged orations and that "More," by
comparison, is limited to relatively brief responses, then
it would appear that Hythloday's argument is intended to be
considered the most persuasive. However, there is
compelling evidence to suggest that we should refrain from
interpreting Hytholday's role so hastily and conclusively.
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Since Book I demonstrates an indebtedness to the
classical tradition, it would be worthwhile to consider the
debate on counsel from the perspective of rhetorical
theory. The debate falls within the purview of deliberative
rhetoric, which is concerned specifically with persuasion -
with moving the audience to action - by arguing the
advantages or disadvantages of a proposed course of action.
By examining the style of argumentation presented by "More"
and Hythloday, we are able to sea how their means of
persuasion reveals a more accurate delineation of character
(or ethos) in spite of Hythloday's ability to maintain the
upper hand throughout the dialogue. While Hythloday's
association with Plato confers on him a degree of
historical and intellectual authority, it should be
remembered that "More" and Hythloday are relative equals,
unlike the naive, participants of typical Platonic dialogues
who innocently set up the dialectical situation for
Socrates to take advantage of. This underscores the
necessity of evaluating the dialogue carefully,
concentrating not only on the issue under debate, but also
on how each character presents his position and what
evidence each offers in support. ’
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Hythloday establishes his stance by arguing that kings
are only interested in matters of war and in enlarging
their own wealth and territory. Furthermore, rulers
surround themselves with counselors who aim to flatter and
who believe their own counsel to be the only advice worth
consideration; therefore they would scorn the proposals
offered by another that are not in complete accord with 
their own.1 Hythloday concludes that if he were to serve as 
a counselor, he would not only be ineffectual, but he would
also eventually lose his position as a result of his
unconventional advice:
If I should propose to any king wholesome
decrees, doing my endeavor to pluck out of his
mind the pernicious original causes of vice and
naughtiness, think you not that I should
forthwith either be driven away or else made a
laughingstock? (114)
As proof for these assertions, Hythloday offers two
hypothetical scenarios: the first centers on a French king
interested in conquering various lands throughout Europe,
the second involves "some king and his council" devising
ways to increase the king's treasury. With regard to the
1 See Sacks, Utopia, 96.
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first scenario, Hythloday states that his advice to the
king would be to concentrate his efforts on the enrichment
of his own kingdom, since one realm is more than enough for 
a single sovereign to govern.2 With regard to the second, 
Hythloday's counsel would be to remind the king that,
similar to the task of a shepherd, it is his station to
ensure the wealth and happiness of his people over his own.
In closing, Hythloday directs the question to "More" with
the assumption that these hypothetical situations are
adequate support for his argument that he would inevitably
fail as a political adviser: "These, and such other
informations, if I should use among men wholly inclined and
given to the contrary part, how deaf hearers think you I
should have?" (120-21).
It is obvious why Hythloday would need to rely on the
supposed or likely outcome of these invented scenarios for
support; in spite of all he has observed while abroad and
his understanding of European domestic and foreign policy,
he has apparently had little practical experience in civic
affairs. Moreover, Hythloday's argument is based on broad
generalizations informed by an overly reductive view of
royal persons and government officials. Certainly, corrupt
2 See Sacks, Utopia, 117-19.
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sovereigns and sycophantic counselors do exist; no one
disputes Hythloday on this point. However, it would seem
that the monarchs and advisors Hythloday has had experience
with would lead him to an alternate conclusion regarding
the potential for advisors to not only offer sincere
counsel, but to do so in the service of thoughtful and
honest kings. In his hypothetical .scenarios, Hythloday 
refers to his knowledge of the Achorians (Greek for "people
without a country") who, after going to war for their
prince and then witnessing the distress this action caused,
demanded of their prince to chose one kingdom and
relinquish the other. According to Hythloday, the Achorian
prince conceded to the demands of his subjects. Hythloday
also mentions his observation of the Macarians ("the
blessed ones") whose king, on the day of his coronation,
declared the hoarding of money and property by a ruler to
be illegal. However, insofar as these honorable peoples are 
entirely unknown to Giles and "More," perhaps Hythloday
intends to isolate corruption as a trait specific to
European rulers and counselors. The fault with this
conclusion becomes evident when we consider that Hythloday
was previously in Europe for a time prior to his meeting
with "More" and Giles. In recounting this prior visit,
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Hythloday reveals his experience with political and social
affairs to be not limited to distant nations. While in
England, Hythloday had the opportunity to converse with
Cardinal John Morton, who, as he specifically notes, was
serving in the position of Lord Chancellor of England at
the time of their meeting. Hythloday describes Morton as a
man:
... not more honorable for his authority than for
his prudence and virtue ... In his speech he was
fine, eloquent, and pithy; in the law he had
profound knowledge; in wit he was incomparable,
and in memory wonderful excellent. These
qualities, which in him were by nature singular,
he by learning and use had made perfect. The king
put much trust in his counsel ... (97)
Hythloday's praise of Cardinal Morton and his description
of the Cardinal's conduct would seem to contradict the
obvious disdain he exhibits toward those active in
political affairs. The Cardinal agrees with Hythloday's
assessment given during his critique of European society
regarding the harsh punishment of thieves, and the Cardinal
is eager to hear him discuss his observations further
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(105) .3 The fact that his experience with Morton does not 
give Hythloday pause to consider a more nuanced assessment
of counsellorship is a feature that serves to undermine his
reliability as well as the validity of his argument.
The logic underlying Hythloday's position on counsel
reflects a scholastic worldview. It is a methodical
perspective primarily interested in classical philosophy,
ethics, and Christian theology. As with any earthly
institution, in politics and government one will inevitably
encounter corruption. However, Hythloday cannot tolerate
any course of action that does not unequivocally exemplify
his orthodox conception of right and wrong behavior. Aware
that few rulers or counselors would respond favorably to
his principled moral philosophy, Hythloday concludes that
any attempt made by a wise person to advise a king or
prince would be a futilely wasted effort. And "More"
agrees. To Hythloday's question of whether his counsel
would fall on "deaf hearers," "More" responds:
Deaf hearers doubtless, and in good faith no
marvel. And to be plain with you, truly, I cannot
3 During this discussion with Morton, Hythloday refers to the 
penal practices of the Polylerites ("much nonsense"), which 
serves as yet another example of More's coinage of ironical Greek 
names for various imaginary peoples and places.
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allow that such communication shall be used, or
such counsel given, as you be sure shall never be
regarded nor received. For how can so strange
informations be profitable, or how can they be
beaten into their heads, whose minds be already
prevented with clean contrary persuasions? This
school philosophy is not unpleasant among friends
in familiar communication, but in the councils of
kings where great matters be debated and reasoned
with great authority, these things have no place.
(121)
"More" points out that Hythloday's scholastic philosophy,
which "thinketh all things meet for every place," results
in counsel that lacks expediency and is therefore
ineffectual; Hythloday's recommendations and manner of
delivery are not suited to obtain potential short-term
advantages (121). Furthermore, it is useless to offer
advice in such a fashion as to render it objectionable.
Additionally, "More" brings to light a fundamental fact of
human existence, namely that the course of action
considered the most "moral" or "ethical," as Hythloday
would define it, does not always coincide with the
appropriate means of resolving the immediate issue at hand.
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This leads "More" to propose, by way of his metaphor of the
stage, the use of a practical civic philosophy advocated by
contemporary humanists when dealing with matters of
government:
But there is another philosophy more civil which
knoweth, as you would say, her own stage, and
thereafter ordering and behaving herself in the
play that she hath in hand, playeth her part
accordingly with comeliness, uttering nothing out
of due order and fashion. And this is the
philosophy you must use. (121)
"More's" metaphor of the stage envisions counselors playing
a significant role within the dramatic setting of politics.
"More's" practical approach reflects the Ciceronian, hence
the humanist, principle of counsel embodying both wisdom
and eloquence. In particular, "More" suggests the principle
of decorum and insists that the manner and use of speech be
suited to its occasion. In regard to matters of government,
guidance must exercise prudence, be offered delicately, and
aspire to expediency rather than disintegrate into pedantic
sermonizing. In addition, "More" argues that the potential
for dishonesty and corruption is no excuse to abandon the
commonwealth. Rather, wise men should be involved in
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political affairs in order to offer constructive counsel
and effect as much positive change as possible:
But you must with a crafty wile and subtle train
study and endeavor yourself, as much as in you
lieth, to handle the matter wittily and
handsomely for the purpose, and that which you
cannot turn to good so to order it that it be not
very bad, for it is not possible for all things
to be well unless all men were good, which I
think will not be yet these good many years.
(122)
Thus, "More" suggests a method that is effective,
practical, and mindful of the difficulties that arise on
account of human fallibility. "More" proposes offering
counsel that is appropriate and eloquently presented as a
means to overcome these obstacles.
"More's" response to Hythloday's long-winded oration
reveals much about his character. He presents his argument
concisely, tactfully, and in a manner that exemplifies his
approach to counsel; his is an eloquent expression that
aims to graciously instruct, clearly convey thought, as
well as to establish and maintain goodwill amongst the
participants in the debate (Wegemer 290). In contrast,
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Hythloday's argument deteriorates into spiteful ranting
that includes generalizations, hyperbole, a priori
assumptions, and ad hominem attacks (Wegemer 293).
Hythloday dismisses "More's" suggestion and bitterly
exclaims: "By this means, nothing else will be brought to
pass, but whiles I go about to remedy the madness of
others, I should be even as mad as they" (122). Hythloday's
lack of compelling proof and practical experience leads him
to offer arguments a priori by appealing to assumed
universal principles. Specifically, he invokes Christ and
his insistence that his commandments be preached from the
rooftops, and Plato's declaration that wise men, seeing it
impossible to "remedy the folly of others," refrain from
participating in the affairs of the commonwealth (122-23).
After declaring all counselors to be corrupt and deceitful
madmen, Hythloday focuses his attack on "More" by comparing
him and such counselors that would apply his civic
philosophy to duplicitous preachers:
But preachers, sly and wily men, following your
counsel (as I suppose) because they saw men evil
willing to frame their manners to Christ's rule,
they have wrested and wried his doctrine, and,
like a rule of lead, have applied it to men's
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manners that by some means at the least way, they
might agree together. Whereby I cannot see what
good they have done, but that men may more
sickerly [chiefly] be evil. (123)
Although Hythloday is characteristically associated with
Plato, his emotionally vehement manner of argumentation is
a far cry from the Socratic dialectical method that aims to
impart knowledge and achieve consensus. Instead,
Hythloday's argument relies on harsh statements and self-
evident propositions asserted without thorough examination
or analysis. The debate on counsel reveals Hythloday to be
a character whose discourse does less to persuade and
elucidate than it does to provoke confusion and skepticism.
The question surrounding Hythloday's reliability suggests
we would be remiss to read Utopia as a strict endorsement
of his views as opposed to "More's."
The dialogue of Book I not only presents the debate on
counsel, but it also enables Hythloday the opportunity, in
his account of dinner at Cardinal Morton's table, to offer
a severe critique of English society. A discussion
concerning the suitability and efficacy of punishment for
those guilty of stealing leads to the examination of
several factors that contribute to England's extensive
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social problems. Hythloday argues that starvation drives
people to steal regardless of the punishment that might be
suffered if one is caught. He then concludes that private
property is the underlying cause for all civil discord:
"where possessions be private, where money beareth all the
stroke, it is hard and almost impossible that there the
public weal may justly be governed and prosperously
flourish" (123-24). In accordance with the contrastive
rhetoric presented in regard to the issue of counsel,
"More," relying on Aristotle's line of reasoning in
Politics, respectfully disagrees:
For how can there be abundance of goods, or of
anything, where every man withdraweth his hand
from labor? Whom the regard of his own gains
driveth not to work, but the hope that he hath in
other men's travails maketh him slothful. (125)
In response, Hythloday delivers his description of Utopia,
where the socio-economic structure is such that "with very
few laws all things be so well and wealthily ordered"
(124). Utopia is thus presented in Book II as a universal
example of a thriving commonwealth built upon the principle
of the community of property.
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That the critique of European society provokes
Hythloday's account of the Utopians has further led critics
to determine the meaning or intent of More's text to follow
properly along the lines of serious socio-political theory.
For instance, Logan interprets More's description of the
Utopian commonwealth as an exercise in comparative
political analysis by providing a theoretical solution to
the social problems discussed in Book I:
Unlike the Republic, which presents its
conclusions simply in the form of argument,
Utopia offers an actual model, so that it tests
results - provides an opportunity to glimpse how
they might work out in practice - even as it
states them. (130)
And J.H. Hexter claims that More's inventiveness is not so
much demonstrated by his concept of a nation that holds all
property in common, but rather it is found in the:
... meticulous detail with which [More] implemented
his underlying social conceptions, proposing all
the basic rules of law and methods of
administration necessary to make community of
property and goods one of the motor forces in a
going polity. (Idea 63)
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These perspectives of Utopia, as a kind of solution to
England's social problems, a theoretical strategy for
reform, or as More's conceptual model of the ideal
commonwealth, are based on a literal interpretation of
More's language. However, by problematizing the character
of Hythloday, More deliberately frustrates the inclination
to interpret Utopia literally. Hythloday's fanatical and 
intolerant behavior during the course of the dialogue in
Book I intentionally influences how we will construe his
discourse in praise of the Utopians in Book II.
The policies and practices of the Utopians are founded
upon the principles of rationality, expediency, and self- 
sufficiency, thus the island of Utopia ostensibly
epitomizes the Greek conception of the model republic.
According to Hythloday, a system designed around the
precept of community of property ensures equality and
reciprocity among the members of the commonwealth since
one's effort is expended to ensure the success and well
being of the state rather than to aid her/his own
accumulation of wealth. Accordingly, the Utopians have
effectively eliminated idleness by systematizing labor
practices such that all citizens are brought up with the
expectation that they will work in agriculture; and in
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addition to farming, they are also trained in a particular 
trade such as wool working, carpentry, or masonry? In order 
to ensure that citizens do not become unfairly relegated to
the strenuous labor demanded by farming, and thus resentful
of completing such work against their will, every two
years, half of every rural household is rotated out of the •
country and sent to the city. The same number is then sent 
from the city to take their places as farm workers.4 5 The 
Utopian system is also evidently superior because it
restricts any potential inclination toward greed and self-
indulgence since no one is in want of anything he/she needs
and nothing is given in exchange for anything else. As
Hythloday states:
Certainly in all kinds of living creatures either
fear of lack doth cause covetousness and ravin,
or in man only pride, which counteth it a
glorious thing to pass and excel others in the
superfluous and vain ostentation of things. (143)
This kind of prideful display is without cause in a system
where everyone takes only what is needed, knowing that
there will never be any shortage of essential goods.
4 See Sacks, Utopia, 136.
5 See Sacks, Utopia, 130.
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Furthermore, although the Utopians only devote six
hours a day to work, any and all opportunities for
licentious or depraved behavior are prevented as all "void
time" (time between the hours of work, sleep, and eating)
is rigorously structured around learning:
... every man as liketh best himself, not to the
intent that they should misspend this time in
riot or slothfulness, but, being then licensed
from the labor of their own occupations, to
bestow the time well and thriftily upon some
other science as shall please them. (137)
Upon waking at roughly four o'clock in the morning,
citizens can choose to attend any number of public lectures
or devote their spare time to his/her trade. After supper,
Utopians can amuse themselves with conversation, music, or
with playing "moral" games that serve to reinforce good 
manners and virtuous principles.6
And yet in spite of the blind conviction with which he
praises their institutions, Hythlodays's description of
Utopian social practices fails to effectively prove the
Utopian system to be superior to or more desirable than any
European system. Hythloday's commentary indeed portrays a
6 See Sacks, Utopia, 146.
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country that appears to have fewer problems thanks to a
social order based on community of property. However,
contrary to his assertion that the Utopians are a "people
well ordered" requiring very few laws, Hythloday reveals
the Utopians to be a people who are completely regimented
by innumerable laws, decrees, and deeply entrenched social
customs. For example, in addition to their organized labor
practices and strict structuring of "free time," male
children must train in the trade of their fathers. If they
desire to learn a different trade, they are placed by
adoption into a family of that occupation. City inhabitants
must move and be reassigned to new houses every ten years.
To maintain the size of all cities, it is decreed that each
city will be limited to six thousand households. If there
are too many households within a city, the excess number is
transferred to another city. Similarly, if the number of
adults within a household exceeds the maximum amount
allotted, the excess number of adults is transferred to
another household that is lacking in number. If the
population of the entire island exceeds the designated
quota, citizens from every city are removed and transported
off the island to a colony on the mainland; and if the
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population of the island should decrease sharply, citizens 
are brought back from the colonies to restore the numbers.7
According to Hythloday, the travel of citizens within
Utopia is also restricted and requires permission. Anyone
who participates in the simple act of traveling to a
neighboring city to visit friends, or to partake in a
little sightseeing, must do so following the proper
protocol, or else risk severe punishment:
If any man, of his own head and without leave,
walk out of his precinct and bounds, taken
without the prince's letters, he is brought back
again for a fugitive or a runaway with great
shame and rebuke and is sharply punished. If he
be taken in that fault again, he is punished with
bondage. . (147) .
While Hythloday repeatedly proclaims the "wealth and
felicity of the Utopian commonwealth," one cannot help but
wonder how any human being could live "joyfully" and
"merrily" in a society that is so restrictive of the
seemingly free choice to decide what trade one wants to
pursue and where one can live and travel within their own
country (198, 200). We might be further compelled to ask
7 See Sacks, Utopia, 142.
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how the Utopians are able to willingly adhere to such a
strictly controlled social system.
According to Hexter, Utopia is the "best of
commonwealths," not necessarily because the Utopians are of
a better nature or character than persons found in any
other society, but because their "laws, ordinances,
rearing, and rules of living are such as to make effective
man's natural capacity for good, while suppressing his
natural propensity for evil" (Idea 59)." Indeed, as
Hythloday implies, the Utopians are not a faultless people,
as can be seen by the penalties one might incur if any
established law or decree should be trespassed against.
However, the effective suppression of any instinctive human
tendency toward self-centered preservation and accumulation
is the product of the Utopians' strict adherence to a
complex pattern of guiding cultural principles that are
internalized by each citizen during various educational and
socialization processes. The Utopian moral philosophy
upholds human happiness as its primary concern, and
happiness is derived by living a life devoted to pleasure.
Yet the Utopian view of "pleasure" consists of a
subscription to an Epicurean ethic that promotes
intellectual reason, rather than transient physical
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pleasures, as the highest form of virtue. According to
Hythloday, the belief that happiness and contentment derive
from seeking honest pleasure finds support in Utopian
religious principles: "the defense of this so dainty and
delicate an opinion, they fetch from their grave, sharp, 
bitter, and rigorous religion."8 However, in Utopia, 
philosophic rationalism must be exercised in conjunction
with their religious principles as it is reason that leads
men to accept and believe them: "Though these be pertaining
to religion, yet they should be believed and granted by
proofs of reason" (155-56). Thus religious tenets are
determined by way of reason rather than, as would be the
case of Christian doctrine, revelation.
It is this elaborately constructed system of belief,
which Hythloday recounts to "More" and Giles with such
fervor, that enables the "success" of the Utopian
commonwealth. The Utopians seek human happiness above all
else; and happiness is the result of pleasure, which is
deemed virtuous when it adheres to their religious
doctrine. And these tenets are the product of reason rather
8 Raphael explains Utopian religious principles to be: "that the 
soul is immortal and by the bountiful goodness of God, ordained 
to felicity; that to our virtues and good deeds rewards be 
appointed after this life and to our evil deeds punishments"
(155) .
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than revelation. Furthermore, the "virtuous" life is one
that is lived according to nature: "Therefore, even very
nature (say they) prescribeth to us a joyful life ... and
they define virtue to be life ordered according to the
prescript of nature" (157). What the Utopians have
effectively accomplished, and what serves as the means by
which Utopia appears to be superior to European society, is
the invention of a moral philosophy that aids in the
complete subjugation of the individual will in order to
benefit the concept of the "common good" by shrewdly
declaring such an endeavor to be rational, virtuous, and
natural:
But in that that nature doth allure and provoke
men one to help another to live merrily (which
surely she doth not without a good cause, for no
man is. so far above the lot of man's state or
condition that nature doth cark and care for him
only, which equally favoreth all that be
comprehended under the communion of one shape,
form, and fashion) , verily, she commandeth thee
to use diligent circumspection that thou do not
seek for thine own commodities, that thou procure
other's incommodities. (157) (emphasis added)
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The Utopian moral philosophy attempts to naturalize certain
human behaviors and actions that do not, in fact, come
naturally, as the examination of numerous earthly societies
would demonstrate, by declaring virtue and pleasure to be
the natural products of philosophic rationalism. What
Hythloday'.s discussion of Utopian philosophy reveals,
perhaps inadvertently, is that if Utopia is to be
considered a model republic, then the simple dissolution of
private property is not the only action necessary to solve
England's problems as discussed in Book I. Such a project
would also apparently require the implementation of an
immutable social order radically different from any
currently known in Europe. It is not only necessary to
prohibit private property, but to also strip citizens of
any right to self-determination and to inhibit any inherent
inclination to work earnestly for one's own gain.
Thus Utopia presents a number of perplexing issues
that must be dealt with (or ignored) if one is to insist on
viewing More's text strictly in terms of philosophy or
political theory. In addition to the question of
Hythloday's reliability, there is the presence of various
absurd and ironic names, which seem to allude to More's
sharp sense of humor. However, Logan's reaction to such
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instances of irony is to warn readers against making the
"fatal error" of mistaking Utopia as nothing more than a
"whimsical potpourri" and of assuming "that More's joking
names signal his disapproval of the ideas associated with
them" (71n, 137n). When trying to account for more
problematic inconsistencies, such as emerge when Hythloday
declares his disdain for counselors or political advisors,
which would seem to contradict his esteem for Cardinal
Morton, Logan demurely suggests: "One may, however, feel
that it is likelier that More, trying to do too much at
once, simply lost track of one of the implications of the
passage" (47).
We must also consider the interpretation of More's
text as the depiction of an ideal republic that presents a
theoretical, though clearly impractical, solution to the
problems evident in European society. Edward Surtz attempts
to account for this impracticality by determining
Hythloday's discussion of Utopia's community of property to
be the accurate reflection of an ideal that is harmonious
with More's Christian orthodoxy: "Hythloday represents
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More's ideal views. At the same time, Surtz claims that//9
the argument presented by "More" in Book I in favor of
private property is indicative of More's view as a sensible
statesman who is aware of mankind's inability to live in a
Christian state where all property is held in common: "In a
word, if he regards communism abstractly or academically,
More favors communism. If he looks at what is in man, he
defends private property" (182) .
And finally we must deal with the dubious description
of the Utopians as a "joyful" or "merry" people and with
the tensions that arise when one ponders the implications
of the Utopian social order. Hanan Yoran accurately
identifies the self-contradictory nature of an order that
proclaims a "general commitment to democracy and liberty"
which is then undermined by a "reality severely restrictive
of political participation and free human activity" (10).
Thus, Yoran concludes that Utopia "fails to elaborate a
coherent ethics and consequently fails to ground the
Utopian social order." As Yoran argues, Utopian moral
philosophy likewise proves to be self-contradictory in its
declaration that reason "leads to both a naturalistic
9 Surtz's conclusion that Hythloday presents More's ideal views 
must of course overlook the question regarding Raphael's 
reliability as a spokesperson.
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ethics and its ultimate transcendence" (14). In other
words, Utopian philosophy claims that reason and virtue are
natural human inclinations while at the same time it
demands that citizens repress and overcome their natural
(innate) tendencies toward self-interest.
And yet to assume that the presence of irony,
contradiction, and absurdity within the text is the result
of some shortcoming or oversight on More's part would be to
ignore a salient feature of his text. In that More
intentionally coined various ironic Greek terms for his
work, it seems negligent to disregard the possible
implications of these amusing terms for our interpretation
of the text. Furthermore, while the process of inventing an
imaginary commonwealth may enable one to present a
conceptual model of an ideal society in order to speculate
how a society designed as such might conceivably function,
the social problems described in Book I were very real
concerns for More, and a description of an ideal
commonwealth based on the principle of community of
property would not offer a practical solution. In fact,
Hythloday's discourse in praise of Utopia exemplifies his
own ineffectual approach to counsel. He argues in favor of
a radical course of action that would not only be
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exceedingly difficult to implement, but would also do
nothing to resolve the immediate problems that he discusses
in Book I. To presume that Hythloday presents More's view
of an ideal, then, is to limit the relevance and
significance of his work in regard to the definite problems
evident in sixteenth-century English society. And while the
observation that the Utopian social order fails on account
of the fact that "More does not introduce any principle
external to its fundamental assumptions concerning reality"
is very perceptive, it is based on a pre-established
assessment that Utopia is intended to be read literally as
political theory and accordingly fails to offer a useful
theoretical model of a flawless social order (Yoran 14).
However, it should be noted that the inability of the
Utopian society to be grounded in any principle or view of
reality outside of itself is not only the failure of the
Utopians, but of any several social orders founded upon
such metaphysical concepts as "reason," "freedom," or
"democracy."
In fact, any resolution to view Utopia as the
description of a model commonwealth means that there is no
choice but to attribute these problematic elements to
failure or oversight. Yet in doing so, the text is
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effectively closed off, and there appears to be no need to
give any further consideration to obvious instances of
irony or contradiction. However, More's Oxford education,
his reputation as a scholar, as well as his professional
achievements as a successful lawyer and politician, would
seem to suggest that he had an exceptional knowledge of
language, and was accordingly able to use discourse
artfully and successfully over the course of his political
and literary career. According to Arthur F. Kinney, such an
expert understanding of language was characteristic of the
humanist writers, whose intellectual training was founded
upon the classical trivium: the study of grammar, logic,
and rhetoric. With respect to this humanist tradition, from
which More, his colleagues, and Utopia emerged, Kinney
states that More can plausibly "engage in wordplay" because
he can rely on readers who "understand that although words
are a necessary means to knowledge, they are also always
multiple in their referents and at best approximate
meanings in their capacity to convey thought" (56).
The implication then is that rather than overlooking
occurrences of humor, inconsistency, and contradiction, we
might consider them as a means of opening the text for
further exploration. Accordingly, a more thorough
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investigation of More's work needs to consider how and why
Utopia's irony, complexity, and ambiguity serve to
deliberately problematize any attempt at a conventional
reading of it. Thus More intentionally compels and, in
fact, requires readers to become skeptical interpreters.
Literal interpretations of Utopia purely as a theoretical
model for social reform or as a description of More's ideal
society are both insufficient and incomplete. Likewise, a
reader's interpretive choice made without acknowledging
More's use of irony and without attempting to resolve the
instances of paradox or contradiction makes for a
simplistic and reductive reading. Thus, it is worthwhile to
investigate the deeper levels of meaning underlying the
elaborate discourse of Utopia.
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CHAPTER THREE
"TO RESEMBLE AND COUNTERFEIT THE FOOL":
DISCOVERING UTOPIA'S IRONIC SUBTEXT
In the summer of 1499, Desiderius Erasmus of Rotterdam
made his first trip to England at the invitation of his
former pupil William Blount, Lord Mountjoy. While there, he
was introduced to Thomas More, who was almost ten years
younger than the Dutch scholar, and at that time, in the
midst of completing his training as a barrister at
Lincoln's Inn. The encounter between the two men led to an
enduring friendship founded upon their mutual enthusiasm
for scholarship and intellectual activity as well as their
shared appreciation for spirited wittiness and humor.
Later, in 1509, when Erasmus returned to London from his
travels abroad, he lodged at the home of his dear companion
Thomas More. During his stay, Erasmus, spurred by More's
fervent encouragement, completed a modest work in the span
of a few days wherein he displayed his clever sense of
humor through a skillful application of wit and irony.
Erasmus dedicated his work, a mock encomium titled In
Praise of Folly, to his good friend More and was, in fact,
delighted with the verbal pun More's named presented in the
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Latin translation of the title: Encomium Moriae - "In
Praise of More." The work was finally revised and published
in Paris in 1511. In the prefatory letter, which he
addressed to More, Erasmus discusses the origin of his idea
to compose a work in praise of folly:
My first hint came from your family name of More,
which is just as close to Moria, the Greek word
for folly, as you are remote from the thing
itself. In fact, everyone agrees that you are as
far removed from it as possible. Besides, I had a
suspicion that this joke would be agreeable to
you because you particularly enjoy jests of this
sort - that is, if I don't flatter myself, jests
seasoned with a touch of learning and a dash of
wit. (3)
Erasmus alludes to More's sophisticated sense of humor and
lively appreciation for clever jokes and jests. In his
closing remarks, Erasmus charges More to "defend [his]
Folly faithfully" (5).
And defend it he did. Erasmus' Moriae was a humorous,
yet incisively satiric, examination of the excessive folly
exhibited by contemporary pedantic theologians and
schoolmen and corrupt rulers, courtiers, and members of the
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clergy. The implicit social commentary, delivered through
Folly's oration, did not escape the attention of the
doctrinaire scholasticists. In 1514, when it became
abundantly clear that more editions of the work would be
forthcoming, Erasmus' adversaries deemed it necessary to
issue a confutation of the accusations put forth in the
Moriae. For the task, the offended parties chose Martin Van
Dorp, an aspiring theologian and former acquaintance of
Erasmus. Van Dorp promptly issued the first of two letters
publicly discrediting Erasmus and the charges presented by
Folly. In response, Erasmus composed his Defense of Folly.
In 1515, when Van Dorp issued his second letter attacking
Erasmus, More became involved in the "humanist-scholastic"
debate and accordingly composed his own extensive letter to
Van Dorp in defense of the Moriae (Satire 31).
More's involvement in the controversy surrounding the
reception of Erasmus' Moriae, as Warren W. Wooden points
out, is significant as it testifies to their mutual concern
over the detrimental effects of medieval theological dogma
and scholastic intellectualism (32). Additionally, More's
defense of Erasmus speaks to their shared appreciation for
the ability of humorously satiric discourse to effectively
comment upon instances of pride, hypocrisy, excess, and
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corruption evident in society. Furthermore, this time
period, from 1515 to 1516, is noteworthy in relation to
More's own literary productivity as it was during this
period that he, while embroiled in the humanist-scholastic
controversy and writing his letter to Martin Van Dorp, was
also at work composing his Utopia. And yet, More's and
Erasmus' familiarity with the function of satiric irony, as
a means to critique social institutions and comment upon
the established cultural practices in which they themselves
were immersed and invested, began to develop before the
emergence of Encomium Moriae. In 1505, Erasmus, in his
efforts to expand his knowledge of the Greek language,
developed an interest in the works of Lucian. He and More,
who shared Erasmus' appreciation of the classical satirist,
began translating the dialogues of Lucian from Greek into
Latin. The Latin versions of Lucian's works were completed
and published in the winter of 1506. Lucian's skillful
execution of satire and his sharp wit, elegant style, and
great capacity for invention and creativity would serve to
influence the works of both Erasmus and More. As E.E.
Reynolds writes:
So Erasmus could see in the contemporary world
material for the pen of a Lucian, and his own
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genius could supply the wit and satire. More had
the same turn of mind and the two friends could
enjoy Lucian and then apply the same method of
criticism to the abuses they saw around them.
(54)
Even as Encomium Moriae and Utopia reveal their foundations
to be fixed in the classical rhetorical tradition, these
works also exhibit characteristics of irony and satire that
are of a distinctly Lucianic nature. Like Lucian, More and
Erasmus found the dogmatic and moralistic idealists of
their day to be prime targets for satiric examination.
I
Lucian of Samosata was born in Syria, in roughly
125 A.D., near the Euphrates and lived during the "age of
rhetoricians" (Works viii). He eventually traveled to
Ionia, where the cities of Smyrna and Ephesus were brimming
with sophists and teachers of rhetoric. It was a time in
the classical age when skilled sophists and famous rhetors
traveled to various cities and exhibited their skills by
appearing in the public forum and delivering an oration ex
tempore about any subject proposed by the audience. Lucian
would similarly earn his living by showcasing his abilities
in rhetoric and public oration while in Ionia, Greece,
Italy, and Gaul. Yet in approximately 163-4 A.D., after he
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settled in Athens, Lucian's career as a rhetor came to an
end as he determined that this particular style of
discourse was more appropriate for those in the legal
profession who vigorously sought to achieve success rather
than to discover truths. For the .sophists and rhetoricians,
victory was achieved by the obfuscation of issues and the
application of specious appeals. Lucian's interests
eventually turned to philosophy, particularly the Socratic
method practiced by Plato; he determined the Socratic
procedure, or dialectic, to be the means to elicit truths
(Works xi). Between 165 to 175 A.D., Lucian's most prolific
period, he would appropriate this method in his own series
of dialogues. Using humor and irony, Lucian offers a
parodic portrayal of philosophical dialectic to interrogate
the seeming validity of the disingenuous and hypocritical
philosophical schools of thought commonly favored by the
educated. In his application of the Socratic dialogue form
to parodic and satiric purpose, then, Lucian provides one
precursor to the method we seem to observe in the dialogue
in Book I of More's Utopia.
Lucian's satiric style and inquisitive nature would
eventually earn him the reputation as a "scoffer"
(Works xxv). "Lucianism," as R. Bracht Branham explains,
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became "synonymous with a particularly virulent form of
disbelief, associated not merely with an absence of faith,
but with a kind of skepticism informed by ridicule for the
credulity of the faithful" (24). It was this tradition of
prose satire, also referred to as Menippean satire, which
Erasmus and More, along with earlier Italian humanists who
were fascinated with Lucian, helped revive during the
European Renaissance. Their translations of Lucian's
dialogues underwent multiple printings and were widely
read. As a result, his works were "among the first Greek
texts to excite aspiring Hellenists of the early
Renaissance" (Bedlam 19).
Lucian wrote in the tradition of Menippean satire. The
term "Menippean" finds its origin in Greek literature;
specifically, it derives from those works, now lost,
written by the Greek Cynic Menippus. According to Scott
Blanchard, the biographer Diogenes Laertius labeled
Menippus' writing style as spoudogeloion (seriocomic), as
it combines verse and prose forms and mixes humor with
philosophical insight. It also utilizes the Cynics'
signature manner of diatribe and invective enfolded within
a dialogue or presented in the form of a mock encomium or
symposium (15). The various manifestations of folly are the
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primary targets of Menippean satire. Northrop Frye explains
that the Menippean satirist sees evil and folly as
"diseases of the mind" (309). Accordingly, Menippean satire
deals with attitudes, beliefs, and ideologies rather than
individual dispositions or temperaments; characters are
considered in terms of their "occupational approach" to
life rather than their social conduct or behavior.
Consequently, the characters of Menippean satire appear
unnatural and stylized and thus serve as spokespersons for
the philosophical practices or schools of thought they
appear to represent (Anatomy 309). More's interest in
Lucian's dialogues would profoundly influence his own work.
Like Lucian, More was interested in the potential of satire
to interrogate the presumed authority and stability of
idealized cultural traditions. And More would accordingly
apply his knowledge of Menippean themes and techniques in
his landmark work, Utopia.
Lucian was superbly skilled at constructing humorously
satiric characters for the purposes of ironically
commenting on various features of Hellenic culture, and his
dialogues subsequently provided More with a framework for
his creation of the character Hythloday. It was likely from
Lucian's works that More discovered how to invent a satiric
68
caricature in order to parody particular attitudes and
practices seen in contemporary sixteenth-century English
society. Our awareness of More's familiarity with Lucianic
techniques serves to elucidate those aspects of Hythloday's
character we initially find so perplexing and problematic.
The examination of Hythloday as a satiric persona offers a
much more insightful and rewarding understanding of his
characterological function than the traditional
interpretations that view him either as a reliable narrator
or as More's spokesperson. Hythloday's argumentative
technique in the dialogue of Book I can be viewed as an
exaggerated and parodic depiction of the dialectical method
employed by the scholastic theologians and schoolmen that
were prevalent in More's day.
The scholastic method attempted to reconcile classical
philosophy and medieval Christian theology. As Paul Oskar
Kristeller explains, medieval theologians synthesized
Biblical teachings, the writings of the early Christian
fathers, and classical philosophical methods that appeared
compatible with Christian doctrine, especially Stoic and
Platonic methods, in order to "transform the subject matter
of Christian theology into a topically arranged and
logically coherent system" (77). In their examination of
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various theological questions, the scholastics attempted to
resolve points of disagreement or contradiction through a
dialectical method that relied upon the understanding that
words can possess multiple meanings. Thus the apparent
'•6'/
ambiguity or contradictory aspect of a theological issue
could be resolved by the application of logical analysis
and argumentation. More, who advocated the humanist
position for a return to the Bible as the original source
of Christianity, vehemently opposed the scholastic method
of disputatio, in which the scholar could argue either side
of a question with equal proficiency and with complete
disregard for determining the true or accurate position
(Satire 37).
Hythloday's argumentative techniques are presented
through a satiric rendering of the formalistic and outdated
scholastic tradition. Hythloday's rigid viewpoint and
didactic and uncooperative style reveal that he is
attempting to forcibly instruct and persuade his two
interlocutors. Rather than participating in a genuine
conversational exchange of ideas, Hythloday presents a
long-winded disputation in response to the question of
counsel. Hythloday's overwhelmingly pompous erudition and
pedantic philosophical language, accompanied by his
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confidence in his interpretation of the scriptures in
addition to using the teachings of Plato as universal
support for his assertions, exemplify a rhetorical style
that relies on sophistic flair rather than impartial and
unbiased observations or practical logic. Hythloday's
idealistic persona accordingly dominates the conversation.
The dialogic exchange among Hythloday, "More," and
Giles is reminiscent of the parodic portrayal of
philosophical dialectic seen in Lucian's dialogue The
Cynic, which was among the works More translated in 1505.
Like the cynic philosopher, Hythloday, in the role of the
philosophus gloriosus, is associated with a conventional,
if not widely respected, scholastic intellectual tradition.
In The Cynic, the questions posed by the curious and
unsuspecting Lycinus incite the cynic philosopher's oration
extolling the virtues of the ascetic lifestyle, as well as
his vicious diatribe condemning the folly of humankind. Yet
throughout the course of the dialogue, the cynic
philosopher's defense of the ascetic lifestyle becomes
fixated on the virtue of the cynic's distinct physical
appearance rather than on the resilience of his moral
convictions. His tirade deteriorates further as a result of
the cynic philosopher's application of illogical reasoning,
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unfounded generalizations, and ad hominem attacks.
According to Branham, the humorous effect of The Cynic, is:
... primarily a function of the particular type of
dialogue developed by Lucian that serves to
dramatize the comic inability of either speaker
to grasp fully the other's point of view because
of their absorption in distinct universes of
discourse. (27)
A similar comic strategy using the dialogue form can
likewise be identified in Book I of Utopia.
Critics have acknowledged More's clever construction
of Hythloday as a means to effectively enable the
achievement of prosopopeia, the distinctive depiction of a
fictive persona in order to heighten the dramatization of
two opposing viewpoints. Hythloday's exaggerated and
argumentative demeanor serves to satirically accentuate the
points of conflict and opposition between his philosophical
viewpoint and the humanist viewpoint espoused by "More" and
Giles. When "More" suggests that the application of a civic
philosophy would be more suitable in the practice of
counseling kings than Hythloday's academic philosophy,
Hythloday employs the specious methodology of the
scholastics by resorting to a priori universals: the
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scriptures and the teachings of Plato. And when "More"
questions the practicality and efficacy of a social order
based on the community of property, Hythloday does not
offer a clear and sensible response that would serve to
answer or address "More's" justifiable concerns. Instead,
he brushes them aside viewing "More's" concerns as proof of
his ignorance: "I marvel not that you be of this opinion.
For you conceive in your mind either none at all, or else a
very false image and similitude of this thing" (126). He
likewise claims to have access to exclusive knowledge of
such a social system and thus proceeds to offer his
illustration of Utopia. As Gerard Wegemer explains,
Hythloday's response demonstrates the extent of his
gnosticism.1 Rather than presenting evidence in support of 
his assertions that would function on a mutually
comprehensible level with "More" and Giles, Hythloday
claims to possess esoteric information to which no one else
has access (302).
In spite of Hythloday's ability to comment on
England's social problems, the gnostic and cynical aspects
1 The island of Utopia alludes to the influences of gnostic 
philosophy; Hythloday refers to the name of the country before 
Utopus' arrival as "Abraxa." According to Sacks, this Greek name 
was "given by the second-century Greek gnostic Basilides to the 
highest of the 365 heavens that he posited" (128n).
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of his attitude underscore his removed and disinterested
attitude. The degree of Hythloday's lack of involvement
with the customs and practices of European society, and
with the opinions and concerns held by "More" and Giles,
are reinforced early in the dialogue of Book I. In addition
to his role as enigmatic traveler long dispatched to
various parts unknown, Hythloday has gone to lengths to
ensure that no relations or ties would oblige him to act in
any way contrary to the principles of his rigid,
formalistic rationalism. When "More" and Giles suggest that
Hythloday might enter the service of a king in order to be
of some use to his relatives and friends, he explains:
As concerning my friends and kinfolk, I pass not
greatly for them, for I think I have sufficiently
done my part towards them already. For these
things., that other men do not depart from until
they be old and sick ... those very same things did
I, being not only lusty and in good health but
also in the flower of my youth, divide among my
friends and kinfolk, which I think with this my
liberality ought to hold them contented, and not
to require nor to look that besides this, I
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should for their sakes give myself in bondage
unto kings. (95)
This physical and emotional detachment is a condition
specific to a distinct kind of satiric persona; it enables
such characters, through the outward guise of objectivity,
to launch into a caustic harangue in their criticism of
society, while at the same time presuming themselves
superior to the human behaviors and social practices they
vehemently condemn. Lucian's cynic philosopher implicitly
refers to himself when he declares: "Accordingly the Gods
have no needs, and those men the fewest who are nearest
Gods" (par. 12). Likewise, Hythloday appears to have few
worldly needs, concerns, or associations, and thus appears
concentrated on achieving the degree of "otherworldliness"
supposedly attained by those of the ascetic frame of mind.
Therefore he exhibits no affection, concern, or
responsibility toward his fellow man. In fact, Hythloday's
argument in favor of withdrawal is founded in large part on
a desire to remain isolated and detached:
Now I live at liberty after mine own mind and
pleasure, which I think very few of these great
states and peers of realms can say. Yea, and
there be enough of them that sue for great men's
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friendships and, therefore, I think it no great
hurt if they have not me, nor three of four such
others as I am. (95)
Hythloday's disillusionment with conventional European
society gives way to a preference for idealism and
independence. As Hythloday becomes more vigorous in his
assertions, his evidence moves from the factual (his
account of dinner with Cardinal Morton), to the
increasingly hypothetical and imaginary (his supposed
scenarios involving invented kings and counsels), to the
completely fantastic and esoteric (his exclusive knowledge
of unfamiliar societies and of the island of Utopia)
(Kinney 81).
Yet More goes beyond the parodic send-up of Lucian's
cynic philosopher. Hythloday's character is one of the
fundamental elements that testifies to the incredible
breadth of complexity More is able to achieve in Utopia.
For More deliberately problematizes the character of
Hythloday, lest we become completely captivated by his
righteous indignation and high moral deportment, or feel
inclined to write him off as a mere caricature of
scholastic pedantry. He is unlike Erasmus' Dame Folly, who,
after she offers an oration in praise of herself, directly
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refers to the folly of her attendants. In the second half
of Moriae, Folly is hardly ambiguous in her scrutiny of
human foolishness and vice. In fact, as Reynolds explains:
"It is now the direct voice of Erasmus rather than Erasmus
speaking by the mouth o.f Folly. The transition is
skillfully done, but a harsher note is sounded" (70). While
the motivation underlying Folly's ironical pronouncements
is more easily discerned as she continues her oration, in
Utopia, Hythloday remains a consistent instrument of More's
skillful use of irony and carefully constructed ambiguity.
In spite of our suspicion of Hythloday's reliability,
insofar as Hythloday, at times, seems to espouse humanist
principles, we are never quite certain when we will need to
reverse what he is saying; we are only certain that we will
invariably be forced to confront the irony embedded in his
discourse.
One such instance of multi-layered irony is in his
account of dinner with Cardinal Morton whereby he offers
his critique of European society. Hythloday's discussion
regarding the suitable punishment of thieves, the
ostentation and greed of aristocrats and merchants that
contribute to rising poverty among farmers, tradesmen, and
laborers, and the hypocrisy and corrupt behavior of rulers
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and state officials echoes the humanist interest in social
reform. However, the accuracy of Hythloday's assessment is
undercut by the fact that he offers this account as
evidence for his argument in favor of withdrawal from
political service, and for his assertion that counselors
would not be interested in his sensible advice, in spite of
the fact that Cardinal Morton is clearly the exception to
this generalization. Hythloday compliments the gracious and
eloquent Cardinal in spite of the fact that Cardinal's
demeanor and behavior are contrary to his preference for
strict and unyielding counsel. This sort of multi-layered
irony serves to heighten the complexity of Hythloday's
characterological function within the dialogue.
In the same instance in which Hythloday delivers his
critique of European society, he includes an account that
is of profound importance specifically for the reader of
Utopia. In summing up his account of dinner with Cardinal
Morton, when the other attendants at the table praise
Hythloday's suggestions solely because they appear to be
endorsed by the Cardinal, Hythloday launches into a
seemingly incidental digression recounting the quarrel that
erupts between a "certain jesting parasite" and a friar who
is also a "graduate in divinity," both of whom are also
7'8
present at the table. Hythloday recollects the event
casually enough:
I cannot tell whether it were best to rehearse
the communication that followed, for it was not
very sad [serious]. But yet you shall hear it,
for there was no evil in it, and partly it
pertained to the matter before said. (Ill)
Hythloday then offers a peculiar introduction for the
parasite:
There chanced to stand by a certain jesting
parasite, or scoffer, which would seem to
resemble and counterfeit the fool. But he did in
such wise counterfeit that he was almost the very
same indeed that he labored to represent. He so
studied with words and sayings brought forth so
out of time and place to make sport and move
laughter that he himself was oftener laughed at
than his jests were. (Ill) (emphasis added)
As Hythloday's description indicates, he is incapable of a
more nuanced assessment of the parasite's function; he
cannot quite distinguish the difference between a genuine
fool and one who would "counterfeit the fool." Hythloday
naively interprets the parasite's ability to provoke
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laughter as an indication of his foolish awkwardness, and
he believes the parasite's occasionally successful
exhibitions of cleverness to be merely the result of luck.
After Hythloday and the Cardinal discuss the possibilities
for restructuring the laws regarding the treatment of
thieves and vagabonds, one of their party wonders aloud how
they might deal with those who are fallen into poverty as a
result of old age or infirmity and are therefore unable to
work to earn a living. The parasite ironically suggests
that these types of needy persons might be sent to the
monasteries to become nuns and laypersons. The friar sees
this as a jest at the expense of secular monks and priests,
so he makes his own attempt at a witty quip. However, the
parasite adroitly turns the friar's remark against him by
equating the mendicant friars with vagabonds. When the
guests see that the Cardinal does not disapprove of the
parasite's retort, they join in laughter at the friar's
expense.
Hythloday offers this account as evidence in support
of a particular assertion; again, he refers to the
disingenuous response of the courtiers and counselors who
mistakenly support the parasite's comic suggestions only
after the Cardinal responds favorably to his jesting.
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However, the reader is able to discern Hythloday's
digression as evidence of something much more significant.
On one level, the digression functions as another
opportunity for More to satirize the specious methodology
and routinely spiteful behavior of the pedantic theologian
who relies on his universals - the scriptures - as the
means to counter the parasite's taunts and refute his
implicit accusations. Moreover, the parasite proceeds to
enrage the theologian to such a degree with his clever
jesting that the indignant theologian resorts to hurling
boorish insults. As Hythloday relates, the friar was:
... in such a rage that he could not refrain
himself from chiding, scolding, railing, and
reviling. He called the fellow ribald, villain,
javel, backbiter, slanderer, and child of
perdition, citing, therewith, terrible
threatenings out of Holy Scripture. (112)
The friar's response only stimulates further concentrated
jesting and ridicule from the parasite. As Hythloday
recounts: "Then the jesting scoffer began to play the
scoffer indeed, and, verily, he was good at it, for he
could play a part In that play no man better" (112)
(emphasis added). The resultant commentary emerges: the
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parasite may be, as Hythloday implies, "playing the fool,"
yet he maintains his composure, while the seemingly learned
friar loses all sense of poise and self-control, and thus
reveals himself to be the genuine fool.
And yet the digression works, on an even subtler level
by providing a clue to the underlying rhetorical strategy
in Utopia. Hythloday inadvertently offers a description of
a character, the friar/theologian, whose role is, in some
ways, analogous to his own. Similar to the theologian's
response to the parasite's statements, the concerns raised
by "More" provoke Hythloday to resort to personal attacks
aimed at "More's" character, and to appeal to scholastic
universals - his interpretations of Plato and the
scriptures - which are likewise manipulated and taken out
of context in order to support his assertions, ironically
resulting in the degradation of Christian and philosophical
doctrines. While Hythloday uses the digression to
illustrate the impediments to sensible and productive
discussion among courtiers, as Branham points out, the
Cardinal's reaction serves as an example of how we should
approach the ironic, humorous, and outwardly ambivalent
discourse presented in Utopia: "For the Cardinal's own more
adept responses serve implicitly as a model of the very
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interpretive skills Utopia requires of its readers"; thus
More requires readers to construe a sophisticated and
learned jest and to be able to distinguish the profound and
provocative aspects of Hythloday's discourse that are
enfolded in language that appears superficially humorous
and whimsical (33).
Early in his literary career, More also translated
Menippus, another dialogue by Lucian, whereby he would
become familiar with another trope of Lucianic seriocomedy:
the theatrum mundi - the dramatic metaphor of "life as a
stage play" - the notion that humans are constantly engaged
in role-playing. More, who greatly appreciated Lucian's
adroit sense of humor, would adapt this trope for his own
work Utopia. In Menippus, the title character grows up
listening to the stories of the Gods written by the poets
Hesiod and Homer. The poets' tales describe the Gods'
violent and rapacious behavior; yet when Menippus becomes a
man, he discovers that human laws contradict the poets and
forbid the depraved behavior exhibited by the Gods. To
resolve his confusion, Menippus seeks out the philosophers
in order that they, as he explains, "would make what they
would of me and give me a plain and reliable map of life"
(158). Yet to his dismay, he finds the philosophers
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advocate differing and contradictory principles in response
to his question. Furthermore, he observes: "that the
practice of these same people was diametrically opposed to
their precepts" (159). Disappointed by the absurdity and
duplicity of the philosophers' methods, Menippus undertakes
a journey to the underworld in search of Tiresias, the
blind seer of Thebes, to learn the best kind of life.
During his journey through the underworld, Menippus
observes the dead, many of them celebrated heroes and
rulers of ancient Greece, only now they possess none of the
distinguishing characteristics that made them remarkable in
life, such as wealth, fame, and beauty. This leads Menippus
to a profound realization regarding the condition of
humankind:
... the life of man came before me under the
likeness of a great pageant, arranged and
marshalled by Chance, who distributed infinitely
varied costumes to the performers. She would take
one and array him like a king ... another she
dressed like a slave; one was adorned with
beauty, another got a ridiculous hunchback; there
must be all kinds in the show. (164)
8 4
With a similar stage metaphor in mind, in Book I of Utopia,
"More" advocates the use of a more civil philosophy that
"knoweth ... her own stage," and emphasizes the merits of
role-playing for'the purposes of providing useful counsel.
Furthermore, "More's" practical advice echoes the
importance Tiresias places on common sense and expediency
when he finally offers, by whispering in Menippus' ear, his
view of the best way of life:
The life of the ordinary man is the best and most
prudent choice; cease from the folly of
metaphysical speculation and inquiry into origins
and ends, utterly reject their clever logic,
count all these things idle talk, and pursue one
end alone - how you may do what your hand finds
to do, and go your way with ever a smile and
never a passion. (167)
By questioning Hythloday's radical assertions, "More"
begins to target his intolerant fanaticism and the futility
of his idealistic philosophy. In spite of Hythloday's
academic logic and high moral purpose, the practicality of
"More's" advice resonates with the reader.
Of course Hythloday cannot perceive the significance
that the role-playing metaphor might have on his
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understanding of the nature of human action and behavior.
When "More" suggests the use of a more civic approach to
counsel, Hythloday cannot conceive of the tangible
circumstances that would make his idealistic vision
impossible to achieve. Because of the lengths Hythloday has
gone to in order to remain detached from the European
social order, he lacks the ability to comprehend the
complexities of human existence, and the ability to ponder
the full range of factors that contribute to the inevitable
need to fulfill specific roles in life, such as counselor
perhaps, for the sake of appropriateness, efficacy, and
expediency. As he demonstrates earlier in his account of
the parasite, who eventually began to "play the scoffer
indeed ... for he could play a part in that play no man
better," Hythloday cannot distinguish when a person might
perform in a particular role in order to accomplish a
specific objective. In the case of the parasite and the
friar, the parasite uses the fool's comic mask to
ironically, and accurately, comment upon the hypocrisy and
arrogance exhibited by the theologian. Hythloday, like the
courtiers at Cardinal Morton's table, is oblivious to the
ironic subtext of the parasite's discourse.
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While "More" and Giles patiently endure Hythloday's
long-winded oration and sophistical argumentation, they do
not appear entirely convinced at the end of the dialogue.
Hythloday's assertion of Utopia's superiority to European
societies elicits from "More" a justifiable degree of
doubt, as well as a genuine curiosity in regard to how a
society based upon the community of property could
conceivably function. Yet it is Giles who seems to undergo
the more drastic change - from enthusiastic admirer to
something more resembling the Lucianic scoffer. Initially,
Giles is impressed by Hythloday's vast knowledge, and this
amazement is what leads to the debate on counsel:
I wonder greatly why you get you not into some
king's court? For I am sure there is no prince
living that would not be glad of you as a man not
only able highly to delight him with your
profound learning, and this your knowledge of
countries and peoples, but also meet to instruct
him with examples and help him with counsel. (94)
However, by the close of the dialogue, when Hythloday
appeals to his esoteric knowledge in his praise of Utopian
institutions and practices: "if you had been with me in
Utopia and had presently seen their fashions and laws, as I
87
did ... then doubtless you would grant that you never saw a
people well ordered, but only there..." Now, Giles is overtly
skeptical: "it shall be hard for you to make me believe
that there is better order in that new land than is here in
these countries that we know, for good wits be as well here
as there" (126). Likewise, the reader of Utopia anticipates
the discourse in Book II with a measure of genuine
curiosity, although perhaps mixed with a commensurate
amount of skepticism.
Since Utopian practices and institutions appear, at
least on a superficial level, to successfully eliminate the
social ills pointed out by Hythloday in Book I, we may be
tempted to embrace his description of Utopia as a model
commonwealth. However, the ironic subtext underlying
Hythloday's discourse results in numerous-absurdities and
contradictions that frustrate any inclination to interpret
Utopia as a literal ideal. While we might lose sight of the
fact that Hythloday is, in essence, presenting an encomium
in praise of an imaginary "No Place," a fact that becomes
troubling every time it comes to mind,, it is equally
confounding to realize that Utopian society appears to be
disturbingly xenophobic and misanthropic. The geographic
characteristics of Utopia and England are strikingly
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similar, and certainly sixteenth-century England did
historically exhibit a measure of insularity; however, the
Utopians go to great lengths to ensure their island's
impenetrability. For example, the bay of Utopia is filled
with dangerous rocks just below the water's surface, making
it possible for only native Utopians to navigate the
channels successfully. Therefore strangers must necessarily
have the accompaniment of a Utopian guide. Yet it appears
that when Utopus, the country's legendary founder,
conquered the country, he was not satisfied with the land's
natural defenses. Before his arrival, the land he conquered
was attached to the mainland with an isthmus. To further
ensure the country's seclusion, Utopus ordered the strip of
land to be dug up: "For King Utopus ... caused fifteen miles
space of uplandish ground, where the sea had no passage, to
be cut and digged up, and so brought the sea round about
the land" (128-9). Yet, in spite of the Utopians' distaste
and distrust of peoples or customs unknown and unfamiliar,
these sensibilities do nothing to prevent their aggressive
sense of entitlement. Without a moment's hesitation, the
Utopians, as part of their population regulatory practices
will establish a colony on the mainland. Should the native
inhabitants refuse to live as ordered under the Utopian law
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appointed by the colonists, the Utopians simply drive the
inhabitants out of their native land: "And if they resist
and rebel, then [the Utopians] make war against them, for
they count this the most just cause of war, when any people
holdeth a piece of ground void and vacant to no good nor
profitable use ..." (142) .
Furthermore, this misanthropic sentiment is not only
manifested by a xenophobic reaction toward other peoples
and cultures; it is also directed inward, influencing the
way the Utopians behave toward one another. Nowhere is this
more clearly displayed than in the Utopian patriarchal
family unit. Harry Berger, Jr. identifies the function of
the Utopian political system in the formation of an
obedient and docile population by way of social
institutions the are designed to assist the interests of
"misanthropic self-deception" (271) . Utopia is presented as
a happy and contented society since its system ensures that
there will never be a shortage of essential goods and
nothing is ever to be given in exchange for what is needed.
In this way, as Hythloday announces: "the whole island is
as it were one family or household" (148). However, Berger
sees the Utopian family unit as an extension of the civil
government and, ironically, as an example of Utopian
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misanthropy - the deliberate attempt to encourage
detachment and prohibit the formation of abiding familial
bonds among relatives. According to Berger:
... the Utopian mentality treats the private
family space as a potential seedbed of conspiracy
against the state, a place in which the constant
face-to-face relationships enable people to keep
their backs to the world, confide in each other,
share secrets, and hatch plots. (282)
Hence, the quality of philia that leads to reciprocity,
support, and cooperation among members of a nuclear family
is pre-empted and forcibly redirected to the larger
society. The result is the various, and disturbingly
impersonal, Utopian practices that serve to benefit the
good of the society rather than autonomous, individually
sustained families, such as moving and separating families
at will for purposes of population control and regulation,
the rotating system of rural and urban laborers, and the
essentially mandatory practice of communal meals.
A more thorough examination of Utopia's institutions
and practices reveals a variety of absurd and troubling
elements that would appear to contradict the status of
Utopian society as an "ideal." In addition to their
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suspicious view of family relationships, they also exhibit
an equally cynical view of the marriage relationship and
the human capacity for romantic love, which results in a
pre-marital practice that even Hythloday acknowledges as
completely ridiculous. When choosing marriage partners, the
prospective bride and groom are displayed to each other,
under the supervision of a respectable woman and man,
completely naked. The Utopians compare the selection of a
mate to the practice of purchasing livestock only after a
thorough inspection has been made, lest some sore or lesion
be hidden by the saddle or some other covering. Thus a
woman's beauty cannot be determined merely by the
attractiveness of her face or hands. The reason for this
practice, as Hythloday explains, is founded on the fact
that some undisclosed offensive or disgusting feature may
result in the hatred of married partners toward each other
for the rest of their lives:
For all men be not so wise as to have respect to
the virtuous conditions of the party, and the
endowments of the body cause the virtues of the
mind more to be esteemed and regarded, yea, even
in the marriages of wise men. Verily, so foul
deformity may be hid under those coverings that
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it may quite alienate and take away the man's
mind from his wife, when it shall not be lawful
for their bodies to be separate again. (170)
Yet this obsession with bodily appearance, and potentially
offensive deformities or abnormalities, seems to be in
outright opposition to the Utopian principle that considers
the use of cosmetics for the purposes of improving one's
beauty to be a prideful and detestable practice. Hythloday
explains this attitude only a few pages after the
discussion of Utopian marriage customs:
For they know even by very experience that no
comeliness of beauty doth so highly commend and
advance the wives in the conceit of their
husbands as honest conditions and lowliness. For
love is oftentimes won with beauty, so it is not
kept, preserved, and continued but by virtue and
obedience. (172)(emphasis added)
While the Utopians are so anxious about the potential for
the body to provoke disgust that they consider it an
absolute necessity to base the entire decision of marriage
on the examination of prospective partners in full
nakedness, Hythloday nevertheless attempts to assert that
virtue and obedience are esteemed more highly in Utopian
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society than physical beauty. With Hythloday's seeming
unawareness of the contradictory implications of his
descriptions of Utopian practices, one cannot help but feel
that he is making things up as he goes along and, in so
doing, loses sight of the resulting paradoxes that emerge,
or else that he is so blindly enamored of Utopian society
that these problematic elements simply do not occur to
him, and therefore he does not consider them worth
accounting for.
Another example of inconsistency in Utopia is
demonstrated in their philosophy of war. According to
Hythloday, the Utopians despise war:
War or battle, as a thing very beastly and yet to
no kind of beasts in so much use as to man, they
do detest and abhor. And contrary to the custom
almost of all other nations, they count nothing
so much against glory as glory gotten in war.
(177)
What would seem to follow is a description of a tranquil,
pacifist society. However, Hythloday goes on to describe in
some detail a society that spends a majority of its "free
time" involved in military training, exercises, and games,
that involve the entire family in the act of combat, and in
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public triumphs when they have skillfully and deceitfully
overcome an enemy. Furthermore, for a people that detest
war, Hythloday relates their preference for battle-axes as
opposed to swords, as they "be mortal as well in sharpness
as in weight, both for foins [thrusts] and downstrokes"
(184). They also excel in laying ambushes and in their
invention of machines of war. They claim to despise war,
yet ironically they unscrupulously hire mercenaries, offer
bribes, and plot assassinations in order to subdue their
enemies. The Utopians are revealed to be a hostile, mean-
spirited, and emotionally vacant people who are aggressive 
in their self-defense as well as in maintaining their
dominance among neighboring nations. Apparently, the
Utopian's have participated in warfare often enough to have
accumulated from their conquered enemies a great deal of
wealth and a large number of landed estates in numerous
different countries. In his recounting of the Utopian
methods of warfare, Hythloday is ironically oblivious to
the fact that they rely on many of the very same methods
employed by European societies, which he condemns in
Book I.
Thus the dichotomy Hythloday establishes at the outset
of his discourse on Utopia begins to break down. His
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assertion that Utopian society is superior to European
society begins to lose its hold on us as we come to
recognize that some of their practices are not only
ludicrous, but also largely impractical. As Branham
observes, the comic paradoxes are "generated by the sheer
consistency of the Utopians' utilitarian logic" (34). The
utilitarian ideology that underlies Utopian institutions is
primarily concerned with maximizing the good for the
greatest number of people, meaning that egalitarianism must
be preserved at all costs. Consequently, the Utopians are
fanatical in their practice of the equitable distribution
of all resources, including food, clothing, goods, and
land. A utilitarian ethic also includes the evaluation of
actions and conduct based on the principle of
consequentialism: the view that the results of a given
action or policy are what ultimately matter, and that the
outcome is what establishes the acceptance of one action or
policy over another. Accordingly, actions are determined
purely by their eventual consequences rather than the means
by which such ends are achieved. This ideology explains, in
part, many of the Utopians' seemingly hostile behaviors and
impersonal traditions. Likewise, similar to Hythloday's
point of view in Book I, the absurdities that result from a
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strictly rationalistic approach reveal the Utopians' lack
of a nuanced sensibility that would be capable of
contemplating the actions and behavior of humans as they
are realistically expressed in a material and ultimately
flawed world.
While Hythloday claims that the Utopians' utilitarian
ideology has evidently resulted in some advantageous and
beneficial effects, it has also resulted in the Utopians'
distinct, culturally contingent attitudes toward gold and
silver. The Utopian social order is built upon the belief
that the accumulation of private property is the primary
cause of social disorder and chaos, and for the greed,
corruption, and arrogance exhibited among people. However,
insofar as they are required to maintain a store of wealth
(for how else do you go about hiring mercenaries, offering
bribes, and financing assassination attempts?), they must
guard against the estimation of gold, silver, and jewels as
valuable commodities and therefore desirable to possess. To
accomplish this, the Utopians inflate the practical
function of iron as a stronger, more superior, and more
easily attainable mineral than gold or silver. At the same
time, they attempt to devalue precious jewels by giving
them to children to play with as toys, and to lessen the
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appeal of gold and silver by using them to fashion common
necessities and for marking slaves:
... of gold and silver they make commonly chamber
pots and other vessels that serve for most vile
uses, not only in their, common halls but in every
man's private house. Furthermore, of the same
metals they make great chains, fetters, and gyves
wherein they tie their bondmen. Finally,
whosoever for any offense be infamed, by their
ears hang rings of gold, upon their fingers they
wear rings of gold, and about their necks chains
of gold ... (150)
One might wonder about the efficacy and practicality of
chains made from gold, a relatively soft metal, to use for
the purposes of restraining slaves and criminals. Further,
one can discern how the Utopians' treatment of precious
metals and stones and the great lengths they go to diminish
the value of gold and silver serve to paradoxically
highlight their complete and utter fascination with them.
Such comic paradoxes function in Book II to frustrate
any sense of an emerging ideal. Throughout Hythloday's
discourse, we are forced to consider a moderating third
view, one that considers the valid points of Hythloday's
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argument in relation to his fanatical idealism, and
considers the humanist argument voiced by "More" and Giles
in relation to their skeptical response to Hythloday's
assertions. In addition, we are engaged in a process of
evaluating Utopian institutions and practices from the
perspective of the subject positions we inhabit and from
those cultural systems in which we are invested. To
emphasize this aspect of Utopia's rhetorical strategy, More
includes a digression in Hythloday's discussion of the
Utopians' attitude toward gold and silver. Similar to the
digression of the parasite and friar in Book I, Hythloday
offers an anecdote in Book II detailing the arrival in
Amaurote of the Anemolian ambassadors who are arrayed in
gold, jewels, and fine clothing, and are unaware of the
Utopians' disdain for wealth and ostentation.
But the Anemolians, because they dwell far thence
and had very little acquaintance with them,
hearing that they were all appareled alike and
that very rudely and homely, thinking them not to
have the things which they did not wear, being
therefore more proud than wise, determined in the
gorgeousness of their apparel to represent very
gods and with bright shining and glittering of
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their gay clothing to dazzle the eyes of the poor
Utopians. (151)
The Utopians, mistaking the elaborately dressed ambassadors
for slaves and fools, greet the Anemolian servants as their
distinguished guests. Insofar as the Anemolians appear to
possess assumptions similar to Europeans, the digression
serves Hythloday's idealizing perspective and functions as
evidence of the folly of European society and to reinforce
the superiority of Utopian ideology. However, the
digression also serves to highlight the subtle satiric
perspective of Book II. According to Branham, the satiric
perspective emerges as an effect of "viewing European
practice in light of Utopian rationality" (34). Thus More
satirizes European society by having their Anemolian
surrogates, who arrogantly presume to dazzle the Utopians
with their finery, presented as the object of Utopian
laughter and ridicule.
Yet this satiric perspective serves a more significant
purpose in Utopia. As Branham explains, the humor of the
anecdote is the result of a distinctively Lucianic form
that depends upon "juxtaposing in a single context two
divergent cultural perspectives" (36). Hythloday's
digression destabilizes the readers' perception of the
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authority of prevailing cultural orthodoxies and
conventions. It problematizes the tendency to view any
social practice or tradition as "natural," recognizing them
instead to be products of cultural construction and
reinforcement. Thus, while the Anemolians acknowledge gold
as possessing a "natural" or objective value, the Utopians
reject this view entirely. Should we feel inclined to
embrace Utopian moral philosophy as a valid interpretation
of life "according to nature," we need only to recall the
account of the Anemolian ambassadors to comprehend the
arbitrary condition of cultural systems of practice.
Because More was clever enough to construct a Utopian
perspective in contrast to apparently European attitudes,
we become aware of the fact that while Utopia's ironic
subtext leads us to identify Utopian practices as
impractical and absurd, the Utopians would just as likely
laugh at our cultural practices and beliefs and find them
to be ridiculous as well.
Interestingly, the digression of the Anemolian
ambassadors comes just before Hythloday's discussion of
Utopian moral philosophy. The Utopians claim the "just"
life as the most pleasurable and, furthermore, that virtue,
pleasure, and a devotion to the common good are the natural
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products of philosophic rationalism. However, as happiness
is the Utopians' primary concern and is consequently
derived from a life devoted to pleasure, their system also
espouses a naturalized hierarchy of pleasures that ranks
the pleasures of the body below the pleasures of the mind.
And within the category of bodily pleasures, the pleasure
of eliminating excess falls below the pleasures of the
harmonious state of physical health. In Utopian philosophy,
the elimination of excess equates such actions as
defecation or relieving an itch by scratching with sexual
intercourse, the discharging of semen into the woman for
the purposes of generating children. Insofar as satiric
discourse customarily relies upon the anatomy of the
grotesque in order to reduce the self-inflated perception
of humankind, the Utopian fascination with the body may
serve as another indication of Utopia's Menippean
influences. As seen in their moral philosophy, which
focuses a great deal on the hierarchical ordering of bodily
functions, and their premarital customs, which demonstrates
their obsession with potentially disgusting physical
imperfections, the Utopians reveal their fixation on the
animalistic and grotesque aspects of human nature in both
their sacred and ritualistic practices.
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Throughout Utopia, More cleverly adapts Lucianic
themes and techniques and in so doing, displays his own
adroit sense of humor, as well as his appreciation for an
amusing jest and lively intellectual activity. His ironic
commentary, aimed at scholastic theologians, idealistic
philosophy, and the abuses of European society, is executed
with a tremendous degree of skill and poise. Indeed he
shared this skill and appreciation with his good friend
Erasmus, who demonstrated his own clever sense of humor in
Encomium Moriae. In the prefatory letter to the Frobenius
edition of Moriae (1515), Giradus Listrius makes the
following observation:
... there are truly things in it which cannot be
understood except by the learned and attentive ...
partly on account of the allusions both frequent
and silently present, and partly because of the
clever subtlety which cannot be easily sensed ...
For there is nothing requiring more talent than
to joke learnedly.
The observation can be similarly made in regard to More's
Utopia. Both works were certainly composed with the intent
to inspire vigorous intellectual inspection and debate. Yet
while the motivations underlying Erasmus' use of satire and
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irony are relatively discernable, to the extent that his
work elicited an outraged and indignant response from the
Louvain theologians, More's own "voice" in Utopia is rather
obscure. Thus the complexity and subtlety of irony in
More's work seems to surpass even that of the paradoxical
Moriae. In addition to identifying the targets of More's
satiric commentary, the reader is actively involved in the
practice of assaying the two sides presented of the debate
on counsel, as well as grappling with the humanist and
idealistic assertions of the seemingly contradictory and
problematic spokesperson, Hythloday. The intricacies of
Utopia perplex and confound. Yet there is the sense that
More composed Utopia not merely for intellectual amusement.
He intentionally "counterfeits the fool," but with a
definite purpose in mind. As Reynolds explains, both More
and Erasmus were interested in more than composing literary
works purely for the purposes of entertainment. Their works
were expressions of their powerful convictions and deeply
held beliefs:
All their mature work was an expression of their
belief in the importance of Christian morals and
the wisdom of Christ. It was part of their
achievement to show that wit and humour, satire
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and irony, could all be used in the service of
righteousness, and that dullness and goodness are
not synonymous. (68)
However, while Utopia may allow us to catch a glimpse of
More's genuine beliefs, he deliberately refuses to offer us
any clear indication of his intent. Thus we can conclude,
in the very least, that part of his fundamental aim was to
obscure his own position, or any authoritative position for
that matter, to the extent that the reader would be forced
to grapple with the ramifications involved in any attempt
to envision and construct an ideal commonwealth. As More
chose to include his namesake within the fictive frame of
Utopia and, at the same time, endeavored to keep any overt
references to his own argumentative viewpoint outside the
confines of his innovative work, the rhetorical strategy of
Utopia accordingly reflects the spirit of a man who enjoyed
a good joke and a witty jest, but who was also reserved,
profoundly serious, and exceedingly private about many of
his beliefs.
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CHAPTER FOUR
"WHAT PART SOEVER YOU HAVE TAKEN UPON YOU":
THE COMPLEX FACETS OF UTOPIA AND ITS CREATOR
From his early years, Thomas More appeared destined
for a life of public service, if not by inclination, then
certainly by virtue of his family tradition. His father,
Sir John More, had been a successful lawyer and judge and
was resolute in his wish that his son likewise pursue a
legal career. After completing law school at Lincoln's Inn
in roughly 1500, Thomas More began his career as a
barrister and maintained a prosperous legal practice. By
1510, More was appointed as Undersheriff of London and was
thus fully ensconced in his vocation as a competent lawyer
and civic administrator. As Undersheriff, More presided
over the Sheriff's Court where he arbitrated in all manner
of cases and countless litigation proceedings involving
diverse crimes and offenses, disputes over commercial
matters, property, and possessions, and the honoring of
debts or other obligations. More's position also obliged
him to serve as London's chief legal advisor in matters
related to the effective maintenance and administration of
city affairs. His reputation as a fair and proficient
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arbiter, and as an eloquent and gifted orator, was widely
acknowledged and resulted in additional appointments to
various councils and committees. Accordingly, in 1515, when
commercial disputes flared between England and the Low
Countries, More was a sensible choice to accompany the
diplomatic embassy to the Netherlands.
More's steadily advancing political career suggests a
temperament that was vigorously devoted to public duty. And
his experience as a lawyer and as Undersheriff provided him
with specialized knowledge of civic and commercial matters,
which provided him, during the course of his six-month
sojourn in the Netherlands, the opportunity to invent
Utopia's detailed political and socio-economic structure.
While the organization of More's imaginary island-nation
may initially appear feasible, as we have seen, More
infuses the discourse of Utopia with enough comic irony and
absurdity to deliberately frustrate the reader's
inclination to accept Hythloday's proposal of Utopia as an
"ideal commonwealth." At the same time, Utopia has
traditionally been regarded as a profoundly personal work -
a work that reflects the dilemmas of its author. Thus in
addition to being argued that Book II serves as a model of
More's conception of an ideal commonwealth, it is also
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widely considered that the debate dramatized in Book I
between "More" and Hythloday reflects More's uncertainty
and indecision over embarking on a career in royal counsel.
Cardinal Wolsey and King Henry VIII offered More a position
in the king's service in January 1516, and this event
ostensibly motivated the composition of Book I. More had
already largely completed what is known as Book II of
Utopia by the time of his return from the Netherlands to
England in October of 1515. Insofar as More had been
serving tirelessly as a civic administrator since 1510, it
seems reasonable to expect his abiding commitment to public
service. Accordingly, we can understand the debate in
Book I as not merely exploring the question of withdrawal
or engagement in relation to public service in general;
rather the debate grapples with the implications of these
two courses of action specifically in regard to the issue
of service as counselor to the king.
If Book I was intended to provide a forum for More to
work out the complicated question of counsel for himself,
then what is perhaps more remarkable than More's ability to
dramatize two sides of the argument - one in favor and the
other against royal service - is his ability to do so
without offering any clear verdict of his own deliberations
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on the subject. Indeed the offer from Wolsey and Henry VIII
would have left More with much to consider. He was well
respected as Undersheriff, and his private legal practice
had been steadily flourishing; he would have to resign
these positions were he to enter the king's service. Also,
his intellectual and scholarly interests would obviously
have to go by the wayside, as the interests of the king
would become his first priority. Furthermore, he was
undoubtedly aware of the propensity for corruption and the
abuse of power in royal affairs. Certainly these are among
the considerations that would have given him pause.
However, in the autumn of 1516, More was appointed to the
Council of the Star Chamber where his successful appearance
and performance in legal proceedings were consistently
observed by Cardinal Wolsey. In the meantime, More
completed Book I. of Utopia, and the first edition was
published in Louvain in December of 1516. More's
accomplishments as an arbiter and examiner in the Council
of the Star Chamber only earned him greater recognition,
and he was entreated by Wolsey and Henry VIII all the more
fervently to become a member of the king's court. In 1517,
More embarked on a second diplomatic embassy, this time to
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Calais, to resolve commercial disputes that had arisen
between England and France.
The suggestion that Book I provided More with a means
to explore the possible courses of action in response to
the king's offer is further supported by the traditional
belief that More was reluctant to enter the king's service.
Some evidence exists that seems to support this assertion.
More's reluctance to serve as Henry VIII's counselor is
reportedly confirmed by Erasmus, who seemed to give the
impression in his letters that More was practically
"dragged" into the king's service (Guy 48).1 Also, Erasmus' 
disapproval of More's decision to accept Henry VIII's offer
is also widely received as fact; as E.E. Reynolds states:
"Erasmus opposed any such engagement and he always
regretted that More eventually became a Councillor" (116).
Indeed More did delay in accepting the offer. In a letter
he wrote to Erasmus in February 1516, More relates the
details of the proposal and explains his reasons for
refusing it:
This, however, I have hitherto refused, and
shall, I think, continue to do so, because, if I
1 John Guy offers an engaging and insightful exploration of the 
traditional view of Thomas More as a "reluctant courtier" in 
Chapter 3 of his biography Thomas More, pages 42-61.
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took it, the place I now hold in the City, which
I prefer to higher office, would either have to
be given up, or retained, much to my regret, with
some offence to the citizens, who, if they had
any dispute with the government, as sometimes
happens, about their privileges, would have less
confidence in me as a paid pensioner of the King.
(qtd in Reynolds 115)
As his explanation reveals, More's refusal was not
necessarily the result of uncertainty over the issue of
royal service; rather, it was in relation to his steadfast
commitment to the citizens of London, whose interests he
felt it was his duty to administer and defend.
Yet other facets of More's life lead some to believe
that he may have favored withdrawing from active
participation in politics. As a young man, More exhibited a
growing interest in the humanist learning that was
intensifying during his years at Oxford, and his enthusiasm
for Greek texts allegedly threatened to cause a rift
between him and his father. More's desire to continue his
education of Greek, as well as his early epigram and verse
compositions, may indicate his preference for the life of a
scholar and "man of letters" as opposed to that of a public
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servant. His personal desire for a life of solitude and
detachment is further supported by the assertion that he
was considering entering the religious vocation of a monk
or priest. More spent approximately four years, beginning
in roughly 1500, residing in or nearby the Charterhouse,
the monastery of the Carthusian order in London. While he
spent his time in religious devotion and prayer and
participated in the spiritual exercises of the order,
More's early biographers expressly state that he did so 
without any vow.2 Yet, Reynolds concludes that More's 
association with the Charterhouse proves: "Thomas More felt
drawn towards the monastic life and tested his vocation as
thoroughly as he could short of entering the novitiate"
(35). However, as Peter Ackroyd points out, the practice of
laymen participating in monastic activities was not
unusual: "the Charterhouse was one of the two or three
Carthusian foundations where young men of spiritual
tendency could lodge while at the same time pursuing a
secular career - in the Inns of Court, for example" (97).
Likewise, John Guy emphasizes More's decision to pursue an
2 For discussion of More's "Charterhouse years" see Reynolds, 34- 
36; Ackroyd, 96-97; and Guy, 21-38.
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"active" life in spite of his affiliation with the
Charterhouse during 1500-1504:
The significance of the Charterhouse years is
likely to be that More spent his time trying to
understand the proper relationship between
philosophy and public life. He left the
philosophical debate open-ended, but in practice
opted for a legal career. (38)
The uncertainty surrounding More's supposed reluctance
to enter the king's service, or of his preference for
contemplative withdrawal over active participation in
politics, demonstrates the difficulty one faces when trying
to determine which character (if any) in Book I is intended
to represent More's actual position in the debate on
counsel. Such a task becomes even more difficult if we
consider that More's first meeting with Prince Henry in
1499 seems to reveal an early and calculated ambition to
gain favor in the eyes of the future king of England. At
the time, the prince was nine years old and was staying at
the royal palace in Eltham nearby where More and Erasmus
were lodging in Greenwich. Upon meeting the prince, More
presented him with a series of verses which he had composed
to commemorate the special event. Erasmus, who had not been
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informed of the purpose of their visit to Eltham, had no
complimentary verses prepared and was dismayed at having
nothing to offer the prince. As More's meeting with the
young Prince in 1499 suggests, he had long held the clever
and intellectual King Henry VIII in high regard. At the
same time, More had energetically pursued advancement in
his political career. As Guy argues:
More's 'call to counsel' was the climax of a
progression by which he steadily gained the
attention of Henry and Wolsey ... More's legal and
commercial work in London, Bruges and Calais
between 1510 and 1517 was so extensive, and so
closely linked to the interests of the Crown and
State, that if it was not at least a limited form
of commitment to a career in politics, what was?
(58)
Whatever reservations More initially may have had about
accepting Wolsey's and Henry's offer, given his established
commitment to civic service, it was only a matter of time
before the Cardinal and the king succeeded in convincing
him to enter the king's service. By the spring of 1518,
More had become the personal attendant to Henry VIII and
was, in the words of Erasmus, totus ... aulicus - "wholly a
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courtier" (qtd. in Ackroyd 121). By the summer of 1518,
More had resigned his appointment as Undersheriff of
London.
More's decision was not an easy or uncomplicated one.
While the role of royal counselor carried with it certain
aspects that would lead him to accept the position, he must
have had grave reservations about it. Certainly one is
liable to experience a measure of conflict over such a
weighty decision. However, any attempt to conclude that
Hythloday reflects More's true stance on the issue of
counsel is clearly problematic. While the debate in Book I
appears, on a superficial level, to represent a struggle
over the choice between two courses of action, the sense of
conflict seems to have less to do with More's indecisive
commitment to public service or his wavering devotion to
his king. In fact, the progress from a legal career to
royal service was customary. Furthermore, such a path was
not considered incompatible with More's interest in
humanism. As Ackroyd points out, members of the court and
council included other humanists from More's scholarly
circle, such as Richard Pace and Cuthbert Tunstall. And
Thomas Linacre served as the king's physician, while John
Colet was the court preacher (183). Even Erasmus, who is
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largely considered to be on the side in favor contemplative
withdrawal and idealistic philosophy, accepted a position
as councilor to Charles the King of Spain, who would later
become Charles V, Holy Roman Emperor. Rather, the debate in
Book I enables More to demonstrate his acute awareness of
how the decision to serve as a courtier or counselor
inevitably stimulates contradictory sentiments and emotions
and conflicts of interest.
This is the facet of More's "self" that is dramatized
so skillfully in the characters of "More" and Hythloday.
More understood that the complex and varied facets of human
nature often found to reside within a single individual
(emotions, ambitions, principles, obligations, desires, and
beliefs) rarely converge neatly to provide an obvious
choice totally in favor of one action over another. Often
such a decision will hinge on a dialectic of contradictory
inclinations either in favor of engagement or withdrawal.
More dedicated himself to the king's service in spite of
the fact that such an act would unavoidably result in the
manifestation of these conflicting feelings.
Although Hythloday is allowed to dominate the debate
in Book I, rather than his arguments in favor of withdrawal
from political life, it is the theatrical metaphor
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presented by "More" that seems to more accurately reflect
More's perspective, as it is an approach that he applied in
his own life. In his metaphor of life as a stage play,
"More" advises Hythloday: "What part soever you have taken
upon you, play that as well as you can and make the best of
it, and do not, therefore, disturb and bring out of order
the whole matter" (121) . While Hythloday considers this
civil approach to be sly and deceptive, "More" advocates
adapting oneself to a role for the express purpose of
benefiting the commonwealth. And as "More" points out, the
approach advocated by Hythloday would be ineffectual and
absurd. More understood that circumstances in life would
necessarily demand that a person give expression to one
facet of their being and act on the basis of certain
beliefs in a given moment. More's experience in public
administration enabled him to recognize that progress and
reform could not take place if one refused to confront and
engage the tangible, less than ideal outcomes of human
action and behavior.
More demystifies the conventional scholastic
perception of human behavior originating from idealized
foundational ethical principles. While the foundationalist
philosopher is concerned with lofty ideals and is rigidly
117
devoted to the search for "Truth," More acknowledged the
importance of rhetorical techniques, such as eloquence and
civility, in practical human affairs. In More's view, the
"rhetorical man" is educated to cope with the vicissitudes
one inevitably encounters in life. Accordingly, he reveals
life to be a series of dramatic roles assumed for the
purpose of accomplishing a specific objective. He uses
Utopia as a means to explore the constructed nature of
identity - the essential need to deliberately fashion a
distinct self for the purposes of public performance and
interaction. In his own life, More apparently concluded
that in the role of counselor, he would be in the best
position to advise and persuade the king to act in the
manner best suited to benefit the commonwealth.
According to Stephen Greenblatt, Utopia reflects
More's self-conscious role-playing - his awareness of his
own mode of engagement within society:
[More] was evidently a canny judge of human
motives, possessed a firm grasp of the complex
network of material interests that underlay the
intricate formalities of Tudor government, and
knew well how to make his own place within these
formalities. (15)
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More's survival in Tudor politics depended upon this
awareness of the need to craft a public identity that was
separate from his private identity. Thus More's consistent
decision to pursue an active life in politics meant that he
would do so within the particular persona he had
"fashioned" for himself. Yet More was also a profoundly
reserved man who chose to keep many of his thoughts private
and to leave various of his opinions unexpressed. As
Greenblatt asserts, More's constructed social identity
necessitated a private retreat - a means to distance
himself from his public role as politician, counselor, and
statesman:
More's sense of his own distinct identity is
compounded of a highly social role, fashioned
from his participation in a complex set of
interlocking corporate bodies - law, parliament,
court, city, church, family - and a secret
reserve, a sense of a life elsewhere, unrealized
in public performance. (41-2)
Greenblatt's notion is significant. If we consider Utopia
as a reflection of More's self-conscious role-playing, as
well as his attempt at "self-cancellation," then we are
relieved from the perplexing and reductive task of
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determining which side of the debate represents More's
"true" perspective. Instead we can view Utopia as a
"playground" wherein More was allowed to explore the
intricate facets that influenced the construction of his
own identity. Utopia is perhaps an expression of the
complexity of More's inner conflicts - the conflict between
the self that maintained a sincere commitment to political
activity, and one that perhaps fantasized about the freedom
and relief of withdrawal and isolated philosophical
contemplation. In this sense, the character of Hythloday
provides More the means to give expression to his fantasy
of self-cancellation; Hythloday's arguments in favor of
withdrawal provide the necessary justification for
terminating the need to fashion multiple selves - the need
to assume roles in order to function in society.
Greenblatt's concept of Utopia as More's attempt at
self-cancellation further influences our view of Book II.
Rather than struggling to determine whether the discourse
of Utopia is, or is not, truly a description of More's
ideal commonwealth, we can see it as the progression of the
experiment More begins in Book I. Hythloday proposes the
abolition of private property as the only means to put an
end to the social problems he discussed earlier: "But that
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they may be perfectly cured and brought to an upright
state, it is not to be hoped for whiles every man is master
of his own to himself" (125). However, More disagrees
questioning how there can be an abundance of goods if no
man is motivated to work for the purpose of his own
prosperity and increase. Hythloday's argument is based on
the perception that it is private property that provokes
competition among men. Individuality causes people to dwell
on the material, tangible aspects that differentiate people
one from another. The implication, according to Greenblatt,
is that "private ownership is causally linked in Utopia to
private ownership of self ... to abolish private property is
to render such self-conscious individuality obsolete" (38-
9). Utopia's social structure is an extension of this
proposition. Their strictly regimented institutions and
practices, communal social habits, utilitarian ideology,
even their so-called policy of religious tolerance, result
in the destruction of the individual. As Greenblatt states,
Utopian society prohibits the development of a distinct and
private self by "eliminating, among other things, most of
the highly particularized corporate categories in which a
man could locate himself and by means of which he could
say, 'I am this and not that'" (42). Utopia's limitation
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and restriction of seemingly intrinsic personal rights
discourages individuation, and their policy of rigorous
surveillance ensures conformity. Utopia is a society where
all circumstances that necessitate public performance and
the assumption of distinct social roles are removed.
While Greenblatt's analysis provides us a means to
consider Utopia through the perspective of More's
exploration of role-playing and the construction of
identity, it should be remembered that More places the
argument in favor of the abolition of private property, in
order to prevent the development of individual selves, in
the mouth of a "peddler of nonsense." Thus we can also
recognize the extent to which Utopia is also an expression
of More's satiric and lively sense of humor. The existence
of a society structured such that the need to construct
identities for oneself is eliminated is an example of
idealistic thinking; hence, More's exploration of self­
cancellation ironically results in the portrayal of a
ludicrous and illogical society. One of the most consistent
features of Utopia is its focus on exposing the limitations
of idealistic thinking. It is this quality that
compellingly demonstrates Utopia's association with satire.
More's familiarity with Lucianic techniques provided him
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with a medium of expression suited to his life-long
fascination with the contradictions that result from
humanity's over-confident belief in appearances and
illusions. Since such confidence is typically considered to
be the consequence of pride, satire seeks to reduce the
self-inflated perception of humankind. Satiric discourse
commonly draws attention to the fallen, animalistic aspects
of human beings. At this point, when humans begin to think
of themselves as lofty and enlightened creatures, they are
first confronted, and then disgusted and disillusioned, as
a result of the reflective function of the satiric
portrayal - by the realization of their inherently foul and
grotesque qualities. Accordingly, lest we begin to accept
the assertion of the Utopians as a rational and idyllic
people, we are presented with an account of their
hierarchical ordering of bodily functions, their bizarre
premarital customs, and their obsession with bodily
appearance. This obsession with the body makes Hythloday's
admiration of the Utopian lifestyle all the more peculiar.
Hythloday dogmatically argues in Book I in favor of
philosophical contemplation, which implies the otherworldly
notion that the mind should be fully devoted to
contemplating the divine while shunning the material. At
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the same time, he praises the Utopian's method of
rationalization and their moral philosophy, which appears
deeply obsessed with all things bodily and physical.
The humanist recovery of Menippean forms paralleled
the foregrounding of an educational program based on
rhetoric. The emphasis on rhetorical technique provided a
practical approach appropriately suited to the cultural and
political climate emerging in early modern Europe. "More's"
advocation of a civic approach to counsel is an approach to
political involvement that was beginning to replace the
scholastic belief in foundational ideals - the kind of
inflexible stability Hythloday describes as the foundation
of Utopian society. Yet More was not only targeting the
scholastic proponents of philosophical ideals. The ironic
commentary in Utopia is also subtly self-reflexive.
Humanists were extremely conscious of their social roles as
intellectual innovators and disseminators of cultural
practices and beliefs. As a result, Scott Blanchard
explains, humanist scholars customarily turned to the
conventions of Menippean satire as a means for exploring
the implications of the immense humanist project:
Menippean satire is a genre both for and about
scholars; it is an immensely learned form that is
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at the same time paradoxically anti-intellectual.
If its master of ceremonies is the humanist as
wise fool, its audience is a learned community
whose members need to be reminded ... of the
depravity of their overreaching intellects, of
the limits of human understanding. (14)
More's own use of the Menippean form allowed him to
comment, at least indirectly, on the very humanist mode of
thought in which he was deeply invested. One of the
fundamental principles of humanism was its belief in the
potential of humankind. As Arthur F. Kinney explains,
humanists became certain that through education, moral and
ethical development, and intellectual progress, they could
"fashion and refashion and refashion themselves," and
accordingly society would follow; thus "being educable, man
might also be perfectible" (5). More was an enthusiastic
supporter of educational reform and likewise ensured that
learning would have a principal role in his own home, for
his daughters as well as his son. Yet More was also
confronted by what Alistair Fox calls, the "fracture" at
the core of Christian humanism:
On the one hand their humanist enthusiasms
tempted them to believe that men could aspire to
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cultivate their natures and society with an
expectation of attaining happiness in this world.
On the other hand, Christianity and the findings
of their own realistic perception of contemporary
circumstances, instructed them to accept that
human nature was irremediably sinful. (105)
The result of this "fracture" in regard to the humanist
objective of refashioning society is that any attempt to
realize the vision of an ideal society will ultimately be
frustrated. Though it is unlikely that More intended Utopia
to serve as a literal model of social reform, it did
perhaps serve as a means for More to express his
conflicting feelings about the aspirations of the humanist
project, and in so doing, he presents an alleged model
society in order to expose the limitations of any
idealistic policy of social reform. However, at the same
time, the recognizable absurdity of Utopian society
illustrates the humanist notion that the process of reform
must begin at the individual level rather than the
institutional level. Ultimately, the education of the
individual is upheld as the most important step, if not for
the achievement of a perfect society, then at least in the
hope that society could be much improved.
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As the multi-faceted nature of Utopia demonstrates,
More was highly skilled in the art of ironic discourse. Yet
More's use of comic irony was not a trait specific to
himself; as Fox explains, the literature of the early
Renaissance was consistently concerned with politics,
either directly or indirectly (3). As a result, the use of
irony for the purposes of criticism, commentary, and
argument emerged as a trademark technique of Renaissance
literature. This due to the fact that many writers of the
period served as courtiers and in various other political
and administrative offices. As a result, Fox states, "early
Tudor literature is, above all, dramatized and indirect"
(3). The Tudor age was turbulent and problematic, hence
fictive literature produced by writers of the time relied
upon dramatized scenes and dialogues and reflected their
interest in self-preservation. According to Fox, the age
was "full of tensions, ambiguities, and paradoxes, and
these are precisely the aspects of life that their
literature dramatizes" (4). For instance, the critique of
European society in Book I demonstrates Utopia's strategy
of indirectness as it comes from the mouth of Hythloday
("speaker of nonsense") rather than from the mouth of
"More." More's experience as a lawyer and as Undersheriff
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gave him a comprehensive understanding of civic and
commercial matters as well as a specialized knowledge of
London's societal and economic affairs. Consequently, his
grasp of the difficulty and complexity underlying far-
reaching social problems is demonstrated in Utopia. While
More deliberately problematizes the issue of Hythloday's
reliability, the critique in Book I illustrates the
systemic nature of social problems. Accordingly,
Hythloday's discourse begins with considering the issue of
the appropriate punishment for stealing, which leads to the
examination of various other issues - all of which affect
each other. Hythloday's observation that the problem of
thievery remains rampant in spite of the harsh punishment
that is meted out as consequence can be recognized as an
accurate assessment. The continued occurrences of theft
then are indicative of a greater problem involving the
underlying issues of pride, greed, and ostentation of
society. As Hythloday's critique demonstrates, social
problems affect the body generally, like a disease, and
must be treated as such. Rather than mitigating the
symptoms of social problems with innumerable or excessively
harsh laws - for instance, punishing thieves with death -
it is only by treating the disease as a whole that society
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can be returned to good health. This of course leads to
Hythloday's radical proposal of the complete elimination of
private property:
Yea, and whiles you go about to do your cure on
one part, you shall make bigger the sore of
another part, so the help of one causeth
another's harm, forasmuch as nothing can be given
to anyone, unless it be taken from another. (125)
At this point, the reader is poised for Hythloday's
impending discourse of Utopia, which brings with it
descriptions of ridiculous social practices. More's ability
to move from serious social commentary to comically absurd
material functions as a way to obscure his genuine
sentiments and makes his social critique less threatening,
thereby limiting any potential consequences.
The folly of European society is not limited to the
dialogue of Book I. We can also recognize distinctly
European practices in Book II in Hythloday's account of the
Anemolian ambassadors as well as in the discussion of the
Utopian's views of laws and the honoring of treatises.
According to Hythloday, the Utopians object to the making
and renewing of treaties since other nations are constantly
breaking them. Thus treaties are completely ineffective in
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maintaining harmonious relations between countries because
rulers lack the virtue necessary to abide by them.
Likewise, they consider it unjust to expect citizens to
accept and obey laws that are impossible to understand:
They have but few laws, for to people so instruct
and institute very few suffice. Yea, this thing
they chiefly reprove among other nations, that
innumerable books of laws and expositions which
either be in number more than can be able to be
read or else blinder and darker than that any man
may well understand them. (173)
However, this observation regarding the making of vague and
unintelligible laws brings about an amusing comment
concerning lawyers: "Furthermore, they utterly exclude and
banish all attorneys, proctors, and sergeants-at-the-law,
which craftily handle matters and subtly dispute of the
laws" (173). It may initially seem contradictory for More
to criticize lawyers and render them superfluous, given his
own legal career. However, it is another example of More's
ironic sense of humor. Who better to mock the vice of
lawyers than one who is thoroughly familiar with the
conventional role and reputation of lawyers in society? Of
course, this account of the Utopian's disdain for European
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practices comes just before the description of their policy
concerning warfare. In addition to some of their other
practices, such as their ordering of bodily functions, and
their view of marital relationships, readers of Utopia are
likely to find the description of the Utopian's treacherous
behavior in military affairs vile and repellent. And this
is clearly what More intended - for the reader to be
repelled by the behavior of the Utopians, but to see the
parallels between their society and this invented one - for
the reader to recognize aspects of her/his tangible society
within the account of an imaginary one.
As much as Utopia appears to be, on some level, a
reflection of More's inner self, More deliberately uses
irony and comic elements to distance himself from the work.
More maintains his ambiguous position all the way up to the
very end of the book. Following Hythloday's peroration at
the close of Book II, "More" offers us a rare glimpse of
inferiority:
Thus when Raphael had made an end of his tale,
though many things came to my mind which in the
manners and laws of that people seemed to be
instituted and founded for no good reason, not
only in the fashion of their chivalry, and in
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other of their laws, but also, yea and chiefly,
in that which is the principal foundation of all
their ordinances, that is to say, in the
community of their life and living, without any
occupying of money, by the which thing only all
nobility, magnificence, worship, honor, and
majesty, the true ornaments and honors, as the
common opinion is, of a commonwealth, utterly be
overthrown and destroyed ... (201)
Whether we are completely persuaded by Hythloday's
discourse or not, evidently "More" is unable to bring
himself to fully endorse Hythloday's assertions. While
"More's" statement, that "nobility, magnificence, worship,
honor, and majesty" serve as the true ornaments of any
nation, would seem to contradict More's widely reported
contempt for pride and ostentation, the statement should be
considered in relation to Utopia's ironic and humorous 
spirit.3 Rather than offering us a clear indication of 
where, or with whom, our sentiments should align, More
3 This is in particular response to J.H. Hexter's discussion of 
this statement as More's "frivolous defense." In his book, More's 
Utopia: Biography of an Idea, he argues the following: "Not one 
of those contemporaries would have maintained for a moment that 
what mattered in a commonwealth were splendor, magnificence, and 
majesty. What mattered to them were order, harmony, justice, 
peace, and prosperity" (36-7).
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allows the conversation to drop off and remain open-ended.
More's remarkable ability to maintain this level of
ambiguity serves to identify Utopia as an exemplar of
humanist, rhetorical discourse. More insists on continuing
the process of education and intellectual development by
asking the reader to grapple with the multiple and
conflicting implications involved when considering the
arguments of "More" and Hythloday, and when contemplating
the policies and practices of Utopian society. Thus Utopia
stays true to the dynamics of humanist fiction in which the
aim, as Kinney states, is "not merely to entertain or
challenge the reader, but to instruct him. It is another
event that can discipline and cultivate - teach - the mind"
(55). At the same time, More understood the limits of
human rationality, namely that the fallen state of human
nature would never be able to adequately bring the vision
of an ideal into existence. The discourse of Utopian
society serves as a candid exploration of the limitations
and contradictions that are inherent in humanist thinking.
However, our recognition of this facet of Utopia should not
diminish our understanding of More's commitment to
humanism. More was himself an idealist in many ways and
accordingly comprehended the value of humanism's idealistic
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pursuits.- For More, and arguably for humanists in general,
the ability to conceive of a perfect state of existence on
earth, in spite of the inability to realize it, is one of
the only ways to provoke change for the purpose of
improving society. As Fox explains from the perspective of
humanist thinking: "If men could not adequately
conceptualize the state that their idealism prompted them
to seek, far less could they ever expect to realize it on
earth" (102). In other words, reform of any kind cannot
occur if humans are incapable of envisioning a better
condition of existence.
There is no question that More chooses to deliberately
obscure his position in relation to the issues discussed in
Utopia; he refuses to offer us any clear indication of his
intent. As is demonstrated through the multivalent nature
of Utopia, and as Guy so adequately states, the greatest
paradox about Thomas More is: "his ability to dissimulate
and speak the truth simultaneously" (58). However, it is
telling that More chooses to conclude the discourse between
"More" and Hythloday with a final reinforcement of a civil
philosophical approach. "More," who has had ample
opportunity to observe Hythloday's temperament, decides
against disagreeing with his assertions openly:
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... because I knew that he was weary of talking and
was not sure whether he could abide that anything
should be said against his mind, specially
remembering that he had reprehended this fault in
others, which be afraid lest they should seem not
to be wise enough, unless they could find some
fault in other men's inventions, therefore, I,
praising both their institutions and his
communication, took him by the hand and led him
in to supper, saying that we would choose another
time to weigh and examine the same matters and
talk with him more at large therein. (201)
Rather, "More" reinforces his argument regarding the
essential and practical need for role-playing in social
situations even in his interaction with the idealistic
traveler. Apparently, given Hythloday's intolerant and
dogmatic behavior, there is no other way to courteously
conclude a discussion with him than to assume the role of
someone who agrees with his rigid point of view. But
Hythloday is not merely an idealist, he is one who claims
to have identified, and hence has defined, the ideal
commonwealth. As such, he sees no need to seek it out, or
to strive to bring about the improvement of any other
135
society, hence his argument in favor of withdrawal, and his
inclination toward disinterest and inactivity. Through
Utopia's complex structure, ironic characteristics, and
remarkable multivalence, More skillfully exposes the
limitations of rigid, idealistic thinking, and
simultaneously demonstrates that the pursuit of the
ineffable and unattainable ideal is necessary to sustain
our concerted efforts toward progress and reform.
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